The Transaction Cost Problem in International Intellectual Property Exchange and Innovation Markets by Sonia Baldia




The Transaction Cost Problem in International
Intellectual Property Exchange and Innovation
Markets
Sonia Baldia
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Sonia Baldia, The Transaction Cost Problem in International Intellectual Property Exchange and Innovation Markets, 34 Nw. J. Int'l L. &
Bus. 1 (2013).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol34/iss1/1




The Transaction Cost Problem in International 
Intellectual Property Exchange and Innovation 
Markets 
 
By Sonia Baldia* 
 
Abstract: In recent years, there has been a dramatic surge in cross-border IP 
exchange transactions driven by globalization, open innovation, and the escalating 
strategic value of IP to competitive firms, the positive result of which are significantly 
developed global IP markets.  While critical to these global IP markets, international 
IP exchange remains highly inefficient because parties face excessive transaction 
costs relative to transaction value, both in transaction design and negotiation and in 
transaction enforcement.  These transaction costs arise from the territoriality of IP 
laws and low visibility into individual state IP law regimes that IP exchange 
transactions may implicate, thus imposing on parties the costs and risk of incomplete 
contracts and unpredictable legal rules that undermine transaction confidence and 
value.  This Article explores the causes of the transaction cost problem in cross-
border IP exchange and submits that a normative legal framework based on private 
rulemaking would mitigate transaction costs and increase transactional efficiency, 
and thereby enhance continued growth of global IP exchange markets. 
  
 
* Sonia Baldia is a global sourcing, technology, and IP partner at the law firm Kilpatrick Townsend & 
Stockton LLP in Washington, D.C.  Ms. Baldia is a Registered Patent Attorney at both the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office and the Indian Patent Office, and she is admitted to practice in the District of 
Columbia, New York, and India.  She can be reached at sbaldia@kilpatricktownsend.com.  The author 
gratefully acknowledges the generous support of Widener University School of Law in the preparation 
of this Article.  This Article is for informational purposes only and is not intended to provide legal 
advice.  © 2013 Sonia Baldia. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Intellectual property (IP) is a key strategic driver of competitive 
advantage in today’s global marketplace.1  IP is also the linchpin of the 
evolving open innovation paradigm.2  Both globalization and open 
innovation are profoundly advancing the strategic role and value of IP to 
competitive firms in the global marketplace.  Historically, firms used IP 
rights as traditional exclusionary instruments to assert against competitors 
or defend market share of commercial products.  In recent years, however, 
firms increasingly view IP rights as stand-alone, tradable economic assets 
that can be monetized or bartered.3  Indeed, firms are pursuing IP rights at 
breakneck speed, with applications for IP recognition in all major markets 
surging and new global IP markets emerging as firms increasingly leverage 
IP for strategic gains.4 
Notwithstanding their rapid and broad growth, global IP markets face 
inherent headwinds because private parties encounter ex ante transaction 
costs that are too high, opaque, and unpredictable in cross-border IP 
exchange transactions.5  These ex ante transaction costs cause parties to 
 
1 Companies increasingly and substantially derive market value from their IP assets, with 
reportedly more than 80 percent of the Fortune 100’s total market capitalization now derived from IP 
assets, rather than from traditional industrial assets.  See Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of 
Intellectual Property Assets: An Economic Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 735 (2007); KEVIN 
G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN VALUE OF 
PATENTS (Harvard Business School Press 2000); DAVID J. TEECE, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 
(Oxford University Press 2002); HENRY CHESBROUGH, EMERGING SECONDARY MARKETS FOR 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: US AND JAPAN COMPARISONS 24 (2006) [hereinafter CHESBROUGH, 
EMERGING SECONDARY MARKETS], available at http://www.inpit.go.jp/blob/katsuyo/pdf/download/ 
H17esm-e.pdf. 
2 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT: THE CHANGING 
FACE OF INNOVATION 52 (2011) [hereinafter CHANGING FACE OF INNOVATION], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/econ_stat/en/economics/wipr/pdf/wipr_2011.pdf. 
3 See Ashby H. B. Monk, The Emerging Market for Intellectual Property: Drivers, Restrainers, and 
Implications, 9 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 469 (2009) (noting that new corporate IP strategies are driving 
the evolution of the IP market); Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 1, 29–31 (2012) [hereinafter Ewing & Feldman, Giants Among Us]; JULIE L. DAVIS & 
SUZANNE S. HARRISON, EDISON IN THE BOARDROOM: HOW LEADING COMPANIES REALIZE VALUE 
FROM THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2001) (discussing how corporate entities 
can maximize the value of their intellectual assets). 
4 See e.g., Adam Andrzejewski, Patent Auctions: The New Intellectual-Property Marketplace, 48 
U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 831 (2010). 
5 See Ulrich Lichtenthaler & Eckhard Lichtenthaler, Technology Transfer Across Organizational 
Boundaries: Absorptive Capacity and Desorptive Capacity, 53 CAL. MGMT. REV. (2010); David J. 
Teece, Capturing Value from Technological Innovation: Integration, Strategic Partnering, and 
Licensing Decisions, 18 INTERFACES 46 (1988) (discussing the transaction costs involved in 
transferring knowledge and technological information through arms-length market mediated contracts); 
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS AN ECONOMIC ASSET: KEY 
ISSUES IN VALUATION AND EXPLOITATION 23–24 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/science/ 
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either refrain from entering into transactions, or incur ex post transactional 
inefficiencies and risks that both undermine IP transaction value and inhibit 
the growth and viability of the global IP marketplace.  Such IP transaction 
costs and risks potentially prevent IP markets from reaching full potential 
and threaten open innovation at the global level. 
This Article examines the reasons for high transaction costs and 
inefficiencies inherent in international IP exchange6 between private 
parties, and the current ineffective legal framework on which parties must 
rely to protect their respective IP rights and perceived transaction value.  
This Article then proposes the development and use of a normative legal 
framework based on private rulemaking that would reduce such transaction 
costs and enhance both transactional efficiency and open innovation in 
global IP markets. 
More specifically, Part II explores the surge in IP value over the last 
decade and the corresponding growth in markets that focus on the private 
exchange of IP among innovators, IP owners, IP users, IP prospectors, and 
other market participants.  The market indicators and trends examined in 
Part II firmly support the proposition that firms are increasingly leveraging 
IP as a stand-alone, revenue-generating, tradable asset for strategic gains as 
reflected in the growing number of cross-border transactions involving IP.  
This Part explores more particularly an evolving open business innovation 
paradigm and its core dependency on the flow of knowledge between firms 
and their external partners.  This flow or exchange of knowledge in the 
open innovation model is also spurring intermediate global markets for the 
sale, license, or other exchange of technology and innovation. 
Part III observes and examines the high transaction costs encountered 
by private transaction parties, and the inherent transactional inefficiencies 
in international IP exchange, due to the territoriality of IP rights and the 
lack of harmonized legal rules addressing the transactional aspects of IP 
rights at the international level.  This Part explains that such core legal 
factors inherent in international IP exchange create legal uncertainty and 
unpredictability for transaction parties and thus undermine global IP 
transaction markets and open business innovation. 
Part IV analyzes the prevalent legal framework that transaction parties 
must rely on in attempting to avoid transaction costs and offset legal 
unpredictability emanating from territorial IP rights in international IP 
exchange.  This Part explains that the ex ante information available to firms 
in cross-border IP transactions is incomplete and asymmetric due to legal 
 
scienceandtechnologypolicy/35519266.pdf. 
6 For purposes of this Article, an international or cross-border IP exchange is a business-to-business 
private party transaction involving the transfer, sale, license or other exchange of IP between the parties 
that has links with more than one legal system, such as the residence and places of business of the 
parties, the place of conclusion of the transaction, the places of performance of the transaction, etc. 
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diversity across jurisdictions, which results in incomplete contracts, 
undermines ex post enforcement expectations, and leads to unanticipated 
conflicts with state IP legal rules of implicated jurisdictions within a 
transaction.  This Part then concludes that the existing private ordering 
framework is ineffective and fails to sufficiently mitigate ex ante 
transactions costs, ex post risk, and enforcement unpredictability, thus 
undermining IP transaction value. 
In Part V, this Article introduces the idea that private rulemaking is 
the most viable approach to lowering transaction costs and increasing 
transactional efficiency in cross-border IP exchange transactions.  The 
author proposes that the development of normative, nonbinding private 
international transactional IP rules (INT-IP Rules), and the use of such 
INT-IP Rules by parties in contracts would avoid high transaction costs 
caused by the diversity and lack of harmony among IP laws, result in more 
complete and predictably enforceable contracts, and thereby yield 
substantially more transparent and efficient cross-border IP transactions.  
Accordingly, private INT-IP Rules would increase IP exchange market 
participation and foster greater innovation in global IP markets. 
 
II.  SURGE IN IP VALUE AND THE EMERGING GLOBAL IP  
 MARKET 
 
The value of IP to competitive firms has surged remarkably in the 21st 
century.7  Indeed, a leveraged and effectively managed IP portfolio enables 
firms to protect core commercial products against infringers, create the 
“freedom to operate” and avoid third-party IP infringement minefields, 
leverage IP for market positioning, enhance R&D returns, acquire 
exclusive rights to targeted new technologies, gain market entry, and use IP 
as a revenue generator through licensing, sale, joint ventures, and other 
commercial opportunities.8  A distinct marketplace for intangibles is 
emerging in advanced economies such as the United States, Japan, and 
Europe where IP rights are increasingly decoupled from production or 
commercialization of the underlying products and packaged as objects of 
exchange in open markets.9  These markets are becoming large and global 
 
7 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
8 CHESBROUGH, EMERGING SECONDARY MARKETS, supra note 1, at 23–42. 
9 Robert P. Merges, The Emerging Patent Market: What Do We Know, and What Should We Do?, 
MEDIA INSTITUTE (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2011/111511.php.  
Markets for ideas, technologies, knowledge, and information tend to exist and thrive in economies with 
well-defined legal regimes for protecting IP rights.  Patent portfolios particularly require predictable 
and enforceable property rights regimes to gain and retain value.  For these reasons, IP assets and the 
intermediaries that trade them tend to operate within advanced economies. 
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as firms make forays into lucrative foreign markets to monetize IP and take 
advantage of arbitrage opportunities by leveraging domain expertise from 
low-cost jurisdictions.10  Furthermore, the evolving innovation processes 
are spurring an intermediate market for technology and innovation that is 
global in its dimensions.11  These expanding global markets for IP, 
technology, and innovation (collectively, global IP markets) strongly signal 
an important milestone in the evolution of IP as a strategic and revenue-
generating asset. 
A number of IP-relevant market indicators and trends demonstrate the 
increased value of IP and the growth in global markets focused on the 
private exchange of IP among market participants.  The key indicators and 
trends are: (i) the steady growth in multi-jurisdictional, collaborative, and 
non-resident IP filings globally, (ii) the rising cross-border IP-related 
transactions, (iii) the emergence of market intermediaries with diverse 
business models aimed at extracting IP value, and (iv) the evolving 
innovation landscape which is increasingly open, collaborative, and global 
in nature.12 
 
A.  Steady Growth in Multi-Jurisdictional, Collaborative, and Non-
Resident IP Filings Globally 
 
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) data reflect a 
steady increase in the number of application filings globally for patents, 
trademarks, designs, and utility models over the last several years.13  This 
steady increase underscores the trend of growing awareness of IP assets to 
firms across virtually all fields of commercial activity.  Patent data are 
 
10 BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON & INSEAD, INNOVATION: IS GLOBAL THE WAY FORWARD? (2006), 
available at http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Innovation_Is_Global_The_Way_Forward_v2.pdf. 
11 See Keith Sawyer, The Collaborative Nature of Innovation, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 293, 308 
(2009); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OPEN INNOVATION IN GLOBAL NETWORKS (2008) 
[hereinafter OECD, OPEN INNOVATION], available at http://www.imamidejo.si/resources/files/ 
oecd_global_innov.pdf; HENRY W. CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR 
CREATING AND PROFITING FROM TECHNOLOGY (Harvard Business School Press, 2003) [hereinafter 
CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION]; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., RECENT TRENDS IN THE 
INTERNATIONALISATION OF R&D IN THE ENTERPRISE SECTOR (2008) [hereinafter OECD, RECENT 
TRENDS]; UNITED NATIONS, GLOBALIZATION OF R&D & DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Proceedings of the 
Expert Meeting, Geneva, 24–26 Jan. 2005) [hereinafter UNCTAD 2005], available at http://unctad.org/ 
en/docs/iteiia20056_en.pdf.  
12 Id.  See also CHANGING FACE OF INNOVATION, supra note 2, at 6–8. 
13 For example, from 2009 to 2010, trademark class count filings increased by 7.8%, patent filings 
rose by 7.2%, and industrial design applications rose by 14.0%.  WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 
WIPO IP FACTS AND FIGURES, WIPO ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS SERIES (2012) [hereinafter WIPO 
IP FACTS 2012], available at http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/statistics/943/wipo_pub_943_ 
2012.pdf. 
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particularly useful for identifying trends in global inventive activity and 
firms’ patenting strategies.  The data reflect not only a rising propensity to 
patent internationally, as indicated by a steady growth in the patent 
applications filed and granted worldwide and under the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT) administered by WIPO,14 but also a growing trend of 
collaborative inventive activity beyond national boundaries, as indicated by 
the increasing number of international research co-authorships in Figure 115 
and the rising percentage of PCT patent applications with one or more 





















14 From 1995 to 2011, patent applications worldwide doubled from approximately 1.05 million to 
around 2.14 million, with competitive firms accounting for overall 80% of total patent applications.  
Similarly, the total number of patents granted worldwide has steadily increased to approximately 1 
million in 2011.  See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
INDICATORS, WIPO ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS SERIES 45–47 (2012) [hereinafter WIPO INDICATORS 
2012], available at http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/wipi/index.html.  The PCT facilitates the acquisition 
of patent rights in multiple jurisdictions.  In 2011, international patent application filings through the 
PCT set a new record with 182,354 applications.  Id. at 65.  See also WIPO IP FACTS 2012, supra note 
13, at 17. 
15 See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., Science and Engineering Indicators O-11 (2012) [hereinafter NSF 
2012], available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/pdf/seind12.pdf.  Reportedly, international co-
authorships in the world’s science and engineering articles almost quadrupled from 8% in 1998 to 23% 
in 2009, and the growth rate is even steeper in the world’s major science and technology regions, 
ranging from about 27% to 42%.  Id. 
16 See WIPO INDICATORS 2012, supra note 14, at 67–68. 
FIGURE 1	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To be sure, the number of patent applications with co-inventors has 
risen significantly compared to the number of patent applications with a 
single inventor, specifically in high-tech sectors such as electronics, 
instruments, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals.17  The total share of patents 
worldwide involving international co-inventors almost doubled from 4% in 
1991–1993 to 7% in 2001–2003; this growth is even steeper in the PCT 
patent applications.18 
Patent application filings globally by non-residents are also 
increasing, which indicates applicants’ greater demand for seeking 
international protection as IP markets become global.19  In 2011, non-
residents filed 36.6% of global patent applications.20  A similar trend is 
visible with respect to the patents granted to non-residents in the United 
States, as Figure 3 shows.21 
 
17 OECD, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 62. 
18 Id. at 60.  According to the OECD, international co-inventions may be considered a proxy for 
R&D co-operation and knowledge exchange between inventors located in different countries.  See 
CHANGING FACE OF INNOVATION, supra note 2, at 44 (Figure 1.14 shows that the percentage of PCT 
patent applications with international co-inventors grew from 9.2% in 1990 to 25.3% in 2009). 
19 A “non-resident” or foreign applicant is an applicant who resides outside of the respective 
jurisdiction in which the patent application is filed.  WIPO INDICATORS 2012, supra note 14, at 47. 
20 The share of non-resident patent applications differs significantly among patent offices around 
the world, and generally tends to be higher in middle-income countries such as Brazil and India.  For 
example, in 2011 about 50% of patent applications filed with the EPO and USPTO were from non-
residents but this share was much higher in India (79%), Brazil (88.1%), Canada (86.5%), Australia 
(90.7%), Israel (80.2%), and Singapore (89%).  The distribution of global resident and non-resident 
patent grants is 61% and 39%, respectively.  WIPO INDICATORS 2012, supra note 14, at 45–49. 
21 Id.  See also NSF 2012, supra note 15, at 6-49.  The U.S. non-resident share has increased from 
FIGURE 2	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The growth in patenting corresponds to the shifting innovation 
paradigm that is increasingly reliant on knowledge networks and market 
mechanisms for knowledge exchange.22  As competitive firms explore 
ways to enhance their innovation processes through the use of such 
networks and market mechanisms, patents have become a critical enabler 
for innovation because they facilitate the exchange of ideas by creating and 
defining legal rights in proprietary intangible concepts to be transferred, in 
addition to serving as a legal means for excluding others from free-riding 
on an entity’s own ideas.23  In this way, patents encourage disclosure, 
provide economic incentives to license, facilitate contracting, and help 
 
46% in the late 1990s to 51% in 2010.  The EU, Japan, and the Asia-8 collectively received nearly 90% 
of patents granted to all non-U.S. inventors.  Id. 
22 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PATENTS AND INNOVATION: TRENDS AND POLICY 
CHALLENGES 7 (2004) [hereinafter OECD, PATENTS AND INNOVATION], available at 
http://www.oecd.org/science/sci-tech/24508541.pdf. 
23 See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE 
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 7–8, 39–45 (2011) [hereinafter FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE], 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf; CHESBROUGH, EMERGING 
SECONDARY MARKETS, supra note 1, at 22 (explaining that patents may be a crucial enabling factor for 
new market entry and new firm creation and that patents facilitate open innovation through patent 
licensing, cross-licensing, and patent pools); CHANGING FACE OF INNOVATION, supra note 2, at 12 
(well-functioning patent institutions are crucial for innovation). 
FIGURE 3	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create a market for ideas.24 
 
B.  Rising Cross-Border IP-Related Transactions 
 
Empirical data indicate that markets for IP/knowledge-based products 
and services are large and growing.25  International commercial transactions 
involving the export of IP-intensive products and services, including 
innovative business methods, proprietary technology, and other intangibles 
in and among multiple jurisdictions have steadily increased since the late 
1990s.26  Figure 4 below, for example, reflects the growing exports of 
commercial knowledge-intensive services in 1998–2010.27 
IP licensing activities are increasingly becoming major contributors to 
firms’ revenues.28  International royalty and license receipts have 
accelerated dramatically from $10 billion in 1985 to more than $180 billion 
in 2009.29  While a significant portion of the international licensing data 
reflects transactions among affiliated firms, there are indications that the 
share of transactions among unaffiliated firms is growing.30  U.S. firms’ 
royalty and license receipts from foreign entities grew from $13.2 billion in 
1990 to $108 billion in 2010 and U.S. firms’ royalty and license payments 
 
24 Id. 
25 See generally Carol A. Robbins, Measuring Payments for the Supply and Use of Intellectual 
Property, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES AND 
INTANGIBLES IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 139–71 (Marshall Reinsdorf & Matthew J. Slaughter 
eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11608.pdf; Ashish Arora et 
al., Markets for Technology and Their Implications for Corporate Strategy (January 2000) [hereinafter 
Arora, Markets for Technology], available at http://e-archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/10016/6705/1/ 
markets_fosfuri_2000_wp.pdf; Ashish Arora, Intellectual Property Rights and The International 
Transfer of Technology: Setting Out an Agenda for Empirical Research in Developing Countries (2007) 
[hereinafter Arora, Intellectual Property Rights], available at http://www.wipo.int/ip-development 
/en/economics/pdf/wo_1012_e_ch_2.pdf. 
26 Such transactions range from simple technical services and licensing arrangements to complex 
technology transfers, foreign direct investments, and joint R&D for sourcing and commercializing IP. 
27 See NSF 2012, supra note 15, at O-17.  Since most IP exchanges (sale or license) are based on 
private contracts that are subject to confidentiality agreements, robust statistics on IP agreements are not 
available. 
28 See, e.g., Arora, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 25; Arora, Markets for Technology, 
supra note 25 (in the appendix of this article, the author highlights a number of companies such as IBM, 
Texas Instruments, and DuPont that have successfully used proactive licensing strategies to 
dramatically increase their revenues); CHESBROUGH, EMERGING SECONDARY MARKETS, supra note 1, 
at 35. 
29 OECD, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 71–73 (more than 90% of the licensing receipts 
went to firms in the United States, Japan, and the EU); CHANGING FACE OF INNOVATION, supra note 2, 
at 9. 
30 Affiliated transactions are conducted between multinational parent firms and their subsidiaries in 
a different country.  Unaffiliated transactions are conducted at “arms-length” between unrelated parties 
in different countries.  See NSF 2012, supra note 15, at 4-27. 
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to foreign entities rose from $3.1 billion in 1990 to $33.4 billion in 2010, 
reflecting considerable flows of IP in both directions across U.S. borders.31  
Some experts estimate that patent licensing revenues in the United States 






















Data on patent licensing offer useful insight into firms’ evolving 
innovation practices.  In particular, firms strategically deploy patent 
licensing to form new partnerships, establish industry standards, and enter 
new markets,33 as well as to unlock the economic value of unutilized or 
underutilized patents by making the rights available to entities with greater 
interest or ability to exploit them.34  As competitive firms seek new ways to 
 
31 In 2010, U.S. companies received about thrice the volume of receipts for the use of intangibles 
(such as artistic creations, technological innovations, scientific discoveries, and reputation or brand-
related constructs like trademarks) than they paid out in payments.  See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, STATISTICS ON U.S. CROSS BORDER 
TRADE, Royalties and License Fees 2006–2011, available at http://www.bea.gov/international/ 
international_ services.htm.  This data reflects considerable flows of IP in both directions across U.S. 
borders, with U.S. firms licensing IP to foreign entities at a greater level than obtaining IP from foreign 
entities. 
32 OECD, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 71. 
33 See CHESBROUGH, EMERGING SECONDARY MARKETS, supra note 1, at 22. 
34 See Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 190 
(2004) [hereinafter Merges, Dynamism]; Bharat N. Anand & Tarun Khanna, The Structure of Licensing 
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access and monetize IP and continue to expand their footprint in lucrative 
foreign markets, new markets for IP and new market entrants with 
diverging business models are emerging and expanding globally. 
 
C.  Emergence of Market Intermediaries for IP Exchange 
 
In recent years, patents have emerged as high value tradable assets 
spawning a viable and active secondary market for patent monetization.35  
Indeed, large transactions with massive price tags for licensing, sale, and 
purchase of patent portfolios are making mainstream headlines.36  Increased 
awareness among firms of the role and value of patents has raised the cost 
and uncertainty of commercializing new products and services as they face 
a higher probability of unintentional patent infringement when conducting 
business.37  To diversify litigation risk and market exclusion, firms are 
 
Contracts, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 103, 131 (2000) (noting that patents prompt inter-firm contracting by 
market entrants and that licensing activity is higher in industries where patents are stronger); 
CHESBROUGH, EMERGING SECONDARY MARKETS, supra note 1, at 24; OECD, OPEN INNOVATION, 
supra note 11, at 70. 
35 See generally CHESBROUGH, EMERGING SECONDARY MARKETS, supra note 1 (using empirical 
data on the growing numbers of patent reassignments from the USPTO and JPO (Japan) to infer growth 
in secondary patent markets; the author posits that companies usually reassign patents when they are 
selling/acquiring other assets or spinning off business/product lines when the structure of corporate 
control changes or for taking security interests in patents to collateralize debt); ROBERT P. MERGES, 
SECONDARY PATENT MARKETS: A POSSIBLE ROLE FOR STARTUPS (May 17, 2012) [hereinafter 
MERGES, SECONDARY MARKETS], available at http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2012/051712.php; 
Ewing & Feldman, Giants Among Us, supra note 3; Tomoya Yanagisawa & Dominique Guellec, The 
Emerging Patent Marketplace (OECD Working Paper Series, STI Working Paper No. 2009/9, 2009) 
[hereinafter Yanagisawa & Guellec, Patent Marketplace], available at www.oecd.org/science/ 
scienceandtechnologypolicy/44335523.pdf. 
36 See MERGES, SECONDARY MARKETS, supra note 35 (noting that some of these transactions stem 
from the firm’s desire to monetize non-core underutilized technologies while others may be exit events 
for once thriving firms, outcomes of litigation settlements, or tools against threat of litigation and 
holdup problems).  Reportedly, in 2011 now defunct telecom manufacturer Nortel auctioned its suite of 
6,000 patents covering mobile computing and telecommunications for a whopping $4.5 billion to an 
industry consortium comprising of Microsoft, Apple, Ericson, Sony, and RIM, outbidding Google and 
Intel.  In response, Google purchased the smartphone maker Motorola Mobility mainly for its patent 
portfolio (with thousands of patents and patent applications) for $12.5 billion as a defensive move to 
strengthen Google’s patent portfolio and protect its Android technology for mobile devices from 
anticompetitive threats of rival companies such as Apple and Microsoft.  See Chris V. Nicholson, Apple 
and Microsoft Beat Google for Nortel Patents, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2011; Amir Efrati & Spencer E. 
Ante, Google’s $12.5 Billion Gamble, WALL ST. J., August 16, 2011; Ewing & Feldman, Giants Among 
Us, supra note 3, at 27. 
37 Juries have increasingly awarded large sums for patent infringement.  Indeed, patent cases now 
make up a significant number of the largest jury awards in the United States.  See, e.g., Verdict Form at 
6, Carnegie Mellon University v. Marvell Technology Group, Ltd., No. 09-CV-290 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 26, 
2012) (jury awarded Carnegie Mellon University $1.7 billion in damages for Marvell’s willful 
infringement of the university’s two patents on channel detector technology); Verdict Form at 15, Apple 
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increasingly engaging in aggressive defensive patenting, stockpiling large 
patent portfolios via filing more applications, acquiring patents from third 
parties, and cross-licensing.38  The developing secondary market for patents 
with a transactional focus has caused a number of private sector “market 
intermediaries” to mushroom in recent years.39 
A majority of these intermediaries aim to bring together patent users 
with patent creators or owners in a global network, while others essentially 
function as a stock exchange by providing a platform for firms to buy, sell, 
or license IP on an open market.40  More particularly, these intermediaries 
include patent brokers,41 patent exchanges,42 patent assertion entities,43 
 
Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-1846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012) (jury awarded 
Apple over $1 billion in damages for Samsung’s infringement of Apple’s utility and design patents); 
Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (jury awarded $1.53 
billion against Microsoft for infringing Lucent’s audio coding patents); and Verdict Form at 5, Centocor 
Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 07-CV-00139 (E.D. Texas June 29, 2009) (jury 
awarded $1.67 billion against Abbott for infringing Centocor’s patent covering arthritis treatment).  
Steadily rising patent applications and issuance in the last 10 years are resulting in firms’ strategic 
buildup of overlapping patents in complex technological domains (notably biotechnology, 
telecommunications, software, optics, audiovisual technology, semiconductors, smart phones, and 
computing domains).  This creates complications for freedom to operate analysis and heightens the risk 
of hold up and infringement.  See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent 
Pools and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119–50 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. 
eds., 2001) [hereinafter Patent Thickets].  The rising threat of litigation and hold-up problems spurs 
patent exchange. 
38 See Patent Thickets, supra note 37; Allen W. Wang, Rise of the Patent Intermediaries, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 159, 164 (2010) [hereinafter Patent Intermediaries] (arguing that patents reduce 
infringement risk and acquire greater value when aggregated into large portfolios).  
39 Such intermediaries arguably facilitate the process of transaction participants finding each other 
and navigating coordination problems in the market.  See generally Patent Intermediaries, supra note 
38; Andrei Hagiu & David Yoffie, Intermediaries for the IP Market (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 
No. 12-023, 2011) [hereinafter Hagiu & Yoffie, IP Market], available at http://www.hbs.edu/ 
faculty/Publication%20Files/12-023.pdf; Raymond Millien & Ron Laurie, A Survey of Established and 
Evolving IP Monetization Models, 984 PLI/PAT 1033, 1038 (2009). 
40 See, e.g., CHESBROUGH, EMERGING SECONDARY MARKETS, supra note 1, at 116–37 (discussing, 
among other examples, the business models of Shanghai Silicon IP Exchange for semiconductor IP in 
China and Ocean Tomo, a Chicago-based company that facilitates patent exchange).  See also Patent 
Intermediaries, supra note 38; Hagiu & Yoffie, IP Market, supra note 39. 
41 Brokers play a bridging role in linking patent owners with potential buyers or licensees and 
helping IP exchange for a fee contingent on successful transfer.  Examples brokers include Thinkfire, 
IPValue, and Plutritas. 
42 Examples include the Chicago-based Intellectual Property Exchange International, Inc., which is 
a financial exchange that facilitates non-exclusive licensing and trading of IP rights using market-based 
pricing and standardized terms, as well as China’s Shanghai Silicon IP Exchange for transacting 
semiconductor IP. 
43 The term “patent assertion entity” (PAE) is used for non-practicing entities with business models 
focused on the acquisition of patents and the extraction of licensing revenues from allegedly infringing 
firms through litigation or the threat of litigation.  See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 
23.  Such entities, also pejoratively referred to as “patent trolls,” are controversial because of their 
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defensive patent aggregators,44 IP portals,45 and auctioneers,46 to name a 
few.  These intermediaries deploy different business models to extract 
value from IP assets and advance their stated purpose of bringing 
transparency and liquidity to the market for the exchange of patents and 
other related IP.47 
The actual increase in transactional economic efficiency that these 
intermediaries generate remains subject to growing debate in the United 
States, where this emerging practice is most concentrated due to the 
existence of a sizeable patent market.48  But as patent markets become 
more efficient and transparent, and the prevailing intermediary business 
models mature, the rate of patent transactions will accelerate and the patent 
markets will spill over beyond national boundaries.49 
 
D.  The Evolving Innovation Landscape 
 
As knowledge becomes widely dispersed and multi-disciplinary, 
innovation becomes increasingly open, competitive, co-operative, 
globalized, and more reliant on new entrants and technology-based firms.50  
Indeed, innovation in the 21st century is a highly interactive, multi-
 
opportunistic rent seeking behavior.  PAEs hold up other companies that actually make and sell 
products without being aware of their patents.  One example is Acacia Technologies. 
44 Defensive patent aggregators have emerged in response to the rising threat of patent litigation 
from PAEs.  They acquire potentially “toxic” or threatening patents to provide their clients with the 
freedom to operate through licensing in exchange for an annual subscription fee.  Holding an aggregate 
license to a large cluster of patents can lower infringement risk.  Examples include RPX and Allied 
Security Trust. 
45 A number of companies have created portals designed to match potential buyers and sellers of 
patents.  Examples are Yet2.com and Tynax. 
46 These entities hold live auctions of IP, with an auctioneer taking bids on patents, selling lots to 
the highest bidders, and collecting fees from both buyers and sellers.  An example is Ocean Tomo. 
47 See, e.g., James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the 
Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190 (2006) (“Patent trolls provide 
liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to patent markets.”).  These intermediaries function 
in different ways in extracting value from IP assets, including buying, holding, brokering, auctioning, 
aggregating, licensing, or litigating claims.  Others may solicit capital investors to fund IP arbitrage 
opportunities by, for example, purchasing and aggregating perceived undervalued IP assets (often from 
dissolving high-tech firms) and selling or licensing them at higher prices to other third parties.  Id. 
48 These intermediaries naturally are located in jurisdictions where patent markets are most 
developed.  Indeed, these patent markets are largely U.S.-based, and accordingly most of these 
intermediaries operate in the United States.  As these markets mature and expand globally, however, the 
U.S. concentration of this market will diminish.  See Monk, supra note 3, at 9; Yanagisawa & Guellec, 
Patent Marketplace, supra note 35, at 9–11.  Similar secondary markets and intermediary 
“clearinghouses” are also emerging with respect to copyright rights and related transactions. 
49 Id. 
50 OECD, PATENTS AND INNOVATION, supra note 22, at 7. 
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disciplinary process that involves cooperation among a growing and 
diverse network of organizations and individuals across national borders.51  
Such a partnering model is referred to as “networked” or “open” 
innovation.52 
The core insight of this open innovation model, supported by 
empirical data, is that greater openness results in permeable organizational 
boundaries through which innovations efficiently flow between the firm’s 
internal innovation process and an external environment populated by clients, 
suppliers, competitors, governmental and private research institutions, or 
other businesses.53  These internal and external innovation networks, or 
“innovation ecosystems,” enhance problem solving, efficient and best-use 
knowledge sourcing, and idea generation. Thus, the open innovation model, 
consisting of the dual pillars of access and idea exchange, enables a single 
firm to generate internally useful knowledge, accelerate innovation, and 
expand resulting market opportunities.54 
 
1.  From Traditionally Closed to Modern Open Innovation 
 
The evolving networked innovation model is a paradigmatic shift 
from the historical “closed” innovation model.55  As recently as the 1980s 
and 1990s, firms predominantly pursued innovation internally in a closed 
linear and centralized manner using vertically integrated networks.56  The 
 
51 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INNOVATION IN FIRMS: A MICROECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVE (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/berlin/44120491.pdf; Alan MacCormack et al., 
Innovation Through Global Collaboration: A New Source of Competitive Advantage (Harvard Bus. 
Sch., Working Paper No. 07-079, 2007); available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/ 
07-079.pdf. 
52 CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 43.  See also OECD, OPEN INNOVATION, 
supra note 11, at 19–20 (noting various definitions of open innovation). 
53 Id.  See also OECD, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 18.  For example, large pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology companies often depend on external sources of technology (e.g., universities, 
startups, collaborations with other companies) to create, test, and commercialize new products.  
Similarly, companies in the IT and semiconductor sectors often acquire externally developed 
technology to take products to market.  Id. at 35 (noting Cisco’s acquisition of over 130 companies, 
mostly startups, as a strategy to bring in new technology); FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra 
note 23, at 37 (noting that in 2007 over 500 new companies were formed based on technology invented 
in universities, leading to over 700 new products); Erin Shinneman, Owning Global Knowledge: The 
Rise of Open Innovation and the Future of Patent Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 935, 942 (2010).  This 
concept of open innovation is not completely novel. 
54 Id. 
55 CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 21; see also OECD, OPEN INNOVATION, 
supra note 11, at 18–19; FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 23, at 34 (citing AT&T’s Bell 
Laboratories as an example of the predominantly closed innovation model used by many companies in 
the past). 
56 Vertical integration is a corporate structure whereby product development through a supply chain 
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“closed innovation” approach facilitated a firm’s R&D self-reliance and 
solid proprietary control over the innovation process and results, which 
were deemed essential for competitiveness.  A key disadvantage, however, 
was the risk of low return on overall R&D investment and a potentially 
narrow pipeline of commercial ideas.57 
Since the late 1990s, in response to rising R&D costs and shortening 
innovation life cycles, firms have increasingly decentralized innovation 
from corporate R&D headquarters to business units and external sources 
better equipped to provide similar capabilities at lower costs.58  
Furthermore, in a world of widely distributed and multi-disciplinary 
knowledge, whether in the broadening growth and leverage of technology 
in traditional industries or in the development within core technology 
industries, firms seek to move beyond a “closed innovation” model to a 
strategic networked innovation model.  In the networked innovation model, 
ideas do not arise exclusively from linear creativity within a firm, but rather 
from collaborative webs and distributed and diffuse social networks 
between the firm and external parties.59 
Other key catalysts for the shift from closed to open innovation 
include: (i) the growing technological complexity and technological 
convergence, (ii) the higher costs and risks of innovation, (iii) the reduced 
IP misappropriation risk due to strengthened standards of worldwide IP 
 
is owned and controlled by one company.  In the closed innovation model, firms generated ideas in their 
centralized corporate R&D labs, capitalized the best ones through marketable products, and re-invested 
profits into generating more ideas, using the firm’s internal supply chains for production, marketing and 
distribution completely within the four walls of the firm.  Only ideas that were core to the firm’s 
business strategy were capitalized while non-core ideas were typically “shelved.”  Even multinational 
firms that had access to foreign markets for manufacturing and distribution of their products 
predominantly pursued “adaptive R&D” for host country markets through the foreign direct investment 
channels via local affiliates (often wholly-owned subsidiaries).  The flow of ideas/innovation was 
mainly one way from the parent firm’s domestic R&D lab to the foreign-based affiliate’s facility for 
product adaptation and exploitation in local markets.  See OECD, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 
30–32. 
57 Although innovation control was maximized in a closed model, innovation was costly and return 
on investment (ROI) was speculative with a few, if any, successful ideas essentially subsidizing largely 
unsuccessful activity.  Many ideas either ended up being shelved without any ROI or, worse yet, leaked 
to third parties that might then commercialize the ideas without the innovating firm capturing any rents.  
CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 21–41. 
58 As the sourcing model matures, firms leverage their internal and external sources of technology, 
innovation, and supply chain networks in an effort to cut costs, access skilled workforces, drive internal 
growth, and bring products to market.  See FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 23, at 34–35 
(discussing the example of Proctor & Gamble, a firm that embraced open innovation in 2000 with the 
goal of acquiring 50% of its R&D from external sources—a goal it exceeded in 2008, consequently 
increasing R&D productivity, doubling its rate of innovation, and reducing costs).  See also 
CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at xxvii. 
59 Sawyer, supra note 11, at 308. 
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protection, (iv) the ease of cross-border linkages due to advances in 
information and communication technologies, (v) the increased access to 
foreign markets through trade liberalization, and (vi) the global supply of 
cost-effective skilled workforce and science and technology capabilities in 
emerging economies like India, China, and Brazil.60  Figure 5 indicates, for 
example, that R&D employment by U.S. firms at their majority-owned 
foreign affiliates grew by 300% between 1994 and 2009, and that shares of 
R&D performed abroad have gradually shifted from traditional host 
countries, including Europe and Japan, toward other Asian venues as 
shown in Figure 6.61 
Open innovation, coupled with globalization, has reduced barriers to 
entry and created opportunities for new players by permitting a division of 
labor to emerge between those who invent and those who manufacture 
most efficiently.62  This division of labor accelerates the rate of innovation 
and results in broader, faster distribution of new products.63  Adaptive 
R&D in foreign markets has evolved beyond adaptation for local markets 
 
60 OECD, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 27–31; Special Report, Thinking for Themselves: 
India and China Aim to Challenge Western Tech Firms Through Innovation, Not Just Cheap Labor, 
ECONOMIST (Oct. 20, 2005), http://www.economist.com/node/5015165; UNCTAD 2005, supra note 
11, at 4–5, 61–82; Xiaohong Quan & Henry Chesbrough, Hierarchical Segmentation of R&D Process 
and Intellectual Property Protection: Evidence from Multinational R&D Labs in China, INDUSTRY 
STUDIES 7–8 (2008), available at http://web.mit.edu/is08/pdf/Quan.pdf (discussing the recent surge of 
MNC R&D lab investments in China); see also Rakesh Basant & Sunil Mani, Foreign R&D Centers in 
India: An Analysis of Their Size, Structure and Implications (Indian Inst. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 
2012-01-06, 2012) (discussing the growing role and importance of foreign companies in generating 
innovations in India).  In this paper, the authors report that the share of foreign companies in total R&D 
expenditure through foreign direct investment in India has risen to about 20% in 2008 from about 8% in 
2003.  Id. at 14.  The authors also note that the salaries of researchers account for about 45% of the total 
R&D expenditure in the United States and if the same is undertaken in India, the costs can be much 
lower.  Id. at 25–26.  Reportedly, wages of scientists and engineers in Asia and Eastern Europe are 
between 15–40% lower than the wages of their counterparts in the United States and Europe.  This 
permits firms to staff up to accelerate operations.  See generally U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Development, World Investment Report 2005: Transnational Corporations and the Internationalization 
of R&D, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2005 (Oct. 29, 2005), available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/ 
wir2005_en.pdf. 
61 See NSF 2012, supra note 15, at 4-27–4-28. 
62 FTC, EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE, supra note 23, at 7.  Open innovation lowers barriers to entry 
for inventors who do not have access to the capital required to manufacture a product or build 
distribution channels by enabling them to commercialize their innovation and knowledge through 
market-based transactions. 
63 Id.  See OECD, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11.  Small and medium enterprises are less likely 
to be constrained by the high and increasing costs of local R&D facilities.  If they do not need to set up 
full-scale R&D facilities in home countries, they can access a skilled workforce in low cost jurisdictions 
through global innovation networks.  This trend in the globalization of R&D is generally greater in 
technology-intensive industries such as electronics, software, biotechnology, chemicals, and 
pharmaceuticals.  An added advantage is that presence in such locations can lower direct costs of 
research relevant for adapting to local conditions. 
BALDIA_FINAL_34.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/14 9:23 PM 
Northwestern Journal of 




to innovation for global markets, resulting in the multi-directional flow of 



































64 See Edwin Mansfield et al., Overseas Research and Development by US-Based Firms, 46 
ECONOMICA 187–96 (1979).  While a close relationship with local manufacturing is still observed for 
offshore R&D, there is a growing trend of offshoring R&D to develop products for global markets.  
NSF 2012, supra note 15, at 4-27.  As emerging economies continue to build their adaptive capabilities, 
there is reverse innovation flow from emerging economies to developed economies—the technology 
and know-how initially transferred to a foreign R&D center for adaptation is further developed and sent 
back to the parent R&D lab for global markets.  Id. 
FIGURE 6	  
FIGURE 5	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2.  Open Business Innovation 
 
Competitive firms are pursuing open innovation in varying degrees of 
openness, depending on their distinct objectives, values, and practices.65  
The most considered form of open innovation is “open access innovation” 
(or OAI), which is essentially distributive innovation.66  In other words, 
OAI is user-centric innovation and its core driver is to promote open and 
free access and use of IP and its contextual innovation commons.67  
Another form of open innovation, which has obtained far less observation 
and academic or industry scrutiny, notwithstanding its overwhelming 
impact on private market-based transactions involving the exchange of IP, 
is what this author refers to as “open business innovation” (or OBI). 
OBI involves a different set of incentives, drivers, and risks than OAI.  
Among the many variables associated with OAI and OBI, the fundamental 
core consideration with respect to the OAI form and OBI form is the role of 
IP rights and how such rights are leveraged to benefit from each form.  OAI 
communities generally have not relied on IP-based incentives to invent, 
disclose, and disseminate innovations.68  Instead, they expect to benefit 
 
65 A firm’s degree of openness in OBI may vary depending on a number of factors, such as the 
importance of IP and technology, a firm’s strategy, market variables, industry characteristics, and 
growth expectations. 
66 The word “open” often is interpreted as synonymous with royalty-free access or use of the 
innovation commons and the IP that is found there.  This can be, and frequently is, an erroneous 
assumption that can disrupt idea exchange and inhibit market growth because open innovation may still 
imply payment of license fees for use or controlled access to the innovation commons.  See generally 
Merges, Dynamism, supra note 34. 
67 OAI communities seek to enlarge the public domain by sharing knowledge, technology, and 
information as broadly as possible with substantial commitment to user freedom.  OAI outputs are often 
widely distributed rather than concentrated, resulting in innovations that are combined and leveraged in 
so-called innovation communities.  See Katherine J. Strandburg, Evolving Innovation Paradigms and 
the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 41 CONN. L. REV. 861, 878 (2009); Severine Dusollier, 
Sharing Access to Intellectual Property Through Private Ordering, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1391, 1391 
(2007).  For a detailed discussion of the development and implications of open innovation in user based 
communities, see Jason Schultz & Jennifer Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive Patent 
License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs and Tactical Disarmament, 26 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2012) (discussing open source software); Arti K. Rai, “Open and Collaborative” 
Research: A New Model for Biomedicine, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER 
INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 131, 131 (Robert W. Hahn ed. 2005) (discussing open 
access innovation in biopharmaceutical industry). 
68 Two of the prominent OAI communities are the free and open source software projects (FOSS) 
and the Creative Commons, both of which do not allow independent contributors to claim or enforce IP 
rights on their contributions to the software code or licensed content developed or shared within project 
frameworks.  See Merges, Dynamism, supra note 34; FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, www.fsf.org (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2014); OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, www.opensource.org (last visited Jan. 18, 2014); 
CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).  The main objective of 
Creative Commons parallels that of the free open source software movement—to grant basic freedoms 
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primarily from developing, using, and sharing an innovation rather than 
selling it.69  Governance of such communities is heavily reliant on private 
ordering or social ordering such as community norms.70  Differing 
terminology has been used to describe this phenomenon, such as open 
access, open content, and open source. 
Unlike OAI, the OBI model involves commercial, for-profit firms 
seeking to accelerate innovation by strategically leveraging internal and 
external sources to promote internal growth, more robust product 
development, and wider access to markets.71  In stark contrast to OAI, 
access to IP and the innovation commons in OBI is either controlled or 
managed.  The term “open” in OBI thus does not mean or imply “open or 
free access” to innovations, but rather it refers to a firm’s willingness to 
open and expand its boundaries to include the flow of ideas between the 
firm and its external partners through collaborative arrangements.72 
Fundamentally, OBI allows firms to build and rely on global networks 
or eco-systems of innovation to intake new ideas, develop new products 
and services, leverage new and existing IP core to such products and 
services, and keep pace with R&D in competitive global markets.73  OBI 
also supports the development and discovery of new channels to monetize a 
firm’s new and pre-existing non-core IP through more efficient users.74  
Firms can no longer afford to ignore potential return on R&D investment 
from internally developed, but unused, IP.  Rather, they must actively 
exchange such IP with third parties better situated to develop and 
 
of copying and distributing copyrighted artistic and literary works to users.  Other OAI examples 
include the Biological Innovation for Open Society project in the field of agricultural biotechnology, 
launched by the Australian organization CAMBIA.  See CAMBIA, http:/www.cambia.org (last visited 
Jan. 18, 2014). 
69 The overarching purpose of open access schemes is not to simply relinquish the work or 
invention into the public domain but rather to either preempt the work from being privatized by others 
or leverage the exclusive IP rights (namely, copyrights and patents) to guarantee and maintain public 
accessibility of works and inventions.  See Merges, Dynamism, supra note 34, at 5–9 (discussing private 
investments in the field of biotechnology in response to the emerging anticommons problem and the 
role of copyright protection in open source software). 
70 Strandburg, supra note 67, at 885–87; Dusollier, supra note 67, at 1399.  Open access licensing 
schemes regulate the use of works or inventions to which they apply.  An example is the use of the 
copyleft or viral clause of the General Public License (GPL) copyright license to control the 
downstream uses of open source software. 
71 See CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 43–62. 
72 Id.  See also OECD, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 9. 
73 Id.  For example, pharmaceutical companies increasingly rely on externally sourced compounds 
from biotechnology start-ups to widen their product lines.  Another example is the automotive and 
aerospace sector where suppliers play a growing part in the innovation process.  Many of these 
companies shift their innovative activities to their suppliers to boost pipelines, shorten innovation life 
cycle, and increase competitiveness in global markets. 
74 Id.  See also OECD, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 21. 
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commercialize it through various models (such as licensing or joint 
ventures), which can lead to increased technology development.75  OBI 
thus both expands the innovation scope available to firms to achieve core 
business objectives via third party innovation channels, and serves the 
correlative purpose of creating new revenue streams from previously 
unutilized by-product IP via third party distribution channels made 
available as a result of OBI participation. 
While both OAI and OBI require “collaborative inputs,” the 
“innovative outputs” in each form, while remaining proprietary, are 
socialized very differently.  OAI outputs are publicly accessible whereas 
OBI outputs are privately controlled or managed.76  OBI outputs are 
predominantly subject to proprietary exclusions for competitive advantage, 
with a dispositive benefit of a greatly expanded base of ideas and 
technologies available to firms. 
In sum, the in-sourcing of external knowledge, in conjunction with the 
distribution of in-house knowledge in OBI, generate cost and time savings 
by leveraging external developments and improving the probability of 
monetizing knowledge developed in-house that is largely unleveraged by 
the firm.77  The flow of knowledge may take the form of strategic 
transactions ranging from alliances, joint ventures, and joint development 
to acquisition or sale of knowledge through contract R&D, purchasing, or 
licensing.78  Increasingly, OBI is also realized through corporate venturing 
arrangements such as equity investments in university spin offs or venture 
capital investment funds. 79 
The success of OBI depends on the ability of innovation networks to 
share experience, disclose tacit and other forms of proprietary knowledge, 
and develop trust and transparency.  The exchange of IP, therefore, is 
essential for successful OBI.  But IP exchange requires efficient markets 
for IP.  Indeed, an efficient IP market is the sine qua non of OBI. 
 
III.  TRANSACTION COSTS AND TERRITORIALITY OF IP 
RIGHTS 
 
Global IP markets are growing but remain very inefficient as firms 
continue to encounter transaction costs that are high, opaque, and 
 
75 Id. 
76 See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.  
77 CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 93–94 (discussing IBM’s transition to open 
innovation). 
78 Id.  See also OECD, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 37–39. 
79 OECD, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 11. 
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unpredictable.80  High costs in such transactions arise from several factors, 
such as valuation challenges for intangibles, asymmetric information and 
bargaining problems, lack of transparency, and litigation risk as well as 
routinely high search and negotiation costs for transaction parties.81  While 
transaction costs are inherent in every IP exchange,82 such costs are 
particularly high in cross-border IP exchanges.83  High transaction costs 
threaten the viability of the global IP markets and prevent such markets 
from reaching full potential, which in turn threatens open business 
innovation, especially at the global level.84 
 
A.  The Nature of Transaction Costs in International IP Exchange 
 
In an IP exchange, transaction costs are the private costs of 
effectuating the IP exchange and must not be conflated with the value of 
the transaction itself or the value of the IP involved in the exchange.85  
 
80 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
81 Hagiu & Yoffie, IP Market, supra note 39, at 4–6. 
82 See Richard A. Posner, Transaction Costs and Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 325, 325–29 (2005) [hereinafter Posner, Transaction 
Costs].  See also David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking 
Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61 (2005) (discussing the 
pervasiveness of transaction cost minimization in both private law and public law; the authors also 
critically examine the goal of minimizing transaction costs and argue that transaction costs produce 
some corollary benefits that analysts must consider in addressing arguments to reduce or eliminate 
transaction costs). 
83 See generally Gerhard Wagner, Transaction Costs, Choice of Law and Uniform Contract Law, in 
MODERN LAW FOR GLOBAL COMMERCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW HELD ON THE OCCASION OF THE FORTIETH SESSION OF 
THE COMMISSION 39 (2007), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/09-
83930_Ebook.pdf (“The proliferation of legal rules under the current system of legal diversity imposes 
serious costs on enterprises doing business in more than one jurisdiction because they have to comply 
with the differing standards of a whole array of legal systems.”). 
84 See Posner, Transaction Costs, supra note 82.  This article notes the high transaction costs 
inherent in licensing of IP.  These costs may be reduced through legal reform at the national level by 
expanding the scope of implied licensing (that is, permission to use IP without having to negotiate 
permission).  One example is the fair use provision [§107] of the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, which 
permits the user of copyrighted materials to copy such materials without having to pay or negotiate with 
the copyright holder under limited circumstances, and so the transaction costs of finding the copyright 
holder and negotiating the permission are zero.  Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 82, at 72 (“Transaction 
cost minimization has played a central role in shaping the fair use doctrine in copyright law.”).  Under 
the fair use doctrine, the law sanctions an activity that is otherwise a copyright infringement and thereby 
avoids excessive transaction costs.  See Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and 
Economics Approach, 19 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 57, 63 (2005); see also Robert P. Merges, The Law 
and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1999) (discussing ownership rules 
for employee inventions that automatically assign ownership to employers, and the shop rights doctrine 
that automatically confers use rights upon employers in certain situations to conserve transaction costs). 
85 See Posner, Transaction Costs, supra note 82, at 325 (the license fee or contract price in 
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Transaction costs are generally thought of as search costs, bargaining costs, 
and enforcement costs of entering into a transaction.86  A transaction party 
may incur high transaction costs, knowingly or unknowingly, either ex ante 
in search and bargaining costs, or ex post in enforcement costs, or both.  
Additionally, ex ante and ex post transaction costs are inter-related.  In 
other words, incurring high transaction costs ex ante via productive search 
and bargaining reduces ex post uncertainty and thus may, as presumably 
intended, enable parties to avoid or reduce potentially high ex post 
enforcement costs. 
According to the Nobel laureate economist Ronald Coase, if 
transaction costs are zero and property rights are well defined, the parties to 
a transaction can bargain to an efficient result regardless of which party 
holds the property rights.87  Thus, laissez faire markets guarantee efficient 
outcomes through private ordering because there are incentives for all 
affected parties to negotiate and bargain towards the most efficient result 
until it is achieved, provided the transaction costs are minimal to nothing.88  
If transaction costs are high, Coasean bargaining will not be possible.  The 
ideal circumstances of zero transaction costs exist only in a Coasean world 
with perfect markets.  In the real world, transaction costs are inherent in all 
(or almost all) market transactions.89  Transaction costs in and of 
themselves do not play an inherently negative function since search and 
bargaining indeed facilitate informed exchange, resulting in an efficient 
transaction.90  But if transaction costs are too high relative to the 
 
exchange for the IP is the measure of the value of the transaction; the transaction cost is the cost of 
effectuating the transaction and thus realizing the value). 
86 Of these, search costs and bargaining costs are ex ante economic costs of (i) searching and 
evaluating information relevant to the value and risk of the considered transaction, and (ii) bargaining 
and negotiating with the counterparties to the transaction with respect to the issues raised by the 
transaction, deciding those issues, and ultimately reducing that activity to a discrete set of mutually 
agreed upon contractual terms.  The enforcement cost is an ex post economic cost primarily consisting 
of the cost of (x) monitoring performance and enforcing the fulfillment of contractual obligations, and 
(y) efficiency losses that result when conflicts relating to the bargain as memorialized in the contract are 
imperfectly or inefficiently resolved.  Dieter Schmidtchen, Roland Kirstein & Alexander Neunzig, 
Conflict of Law Rules and International Trade: A Transaction Cost Approach 1 (Ctr. for the Study of 
Law and Econ., Discussion Paper No. 2004-01, 2004), available at http://www.uni-saarland.de/fak1/ 
fr12/csle/publications/2004-01_conflict.pdf. 
87 Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–44 (1960); see also Michael 
Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Primer on the Coase Theorem: Making Law in a World of Zero 
Transaction Costs, 11 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 1 (1998). 
88 See Coase, supra note 87. 
89 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 26–27 (2002) 
(defining transaction costs as dead weight losses that reduce efficiency); Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 
82, at 71–72. 
90 Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 82, at 67, 85–89 (Parties incur ex ante search transaction costs to 
overcome problems of asymmetric information, and the acquired information enables them to avoid 
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transaction value, they can impede transactions, and even block them, 
resulting in inefficient economic behavior.91 
Consider the decision of a U.S. patentee-licensor in determining 
whether to license its patent to a licensee resident in China with respect to 
an R&D joint venture in the context of OBI.  The patentee may need to 
incur (i) ex ante search costs such as performing due diligence related to 
the licensee’s conduct in China and engaging legal counsel to advise on 
risks of licensing to a Chinese licensee, (ii) ex ante bargaining costs such as 
attorneys’ fees in drafting, negotiating, and closing the transaction with the 
licensee, and (iii) ex post enforcement costs, such as monitoring the 
licensee’s performance and use of the patent in compliance with the license 
terms, and possibly litigation costs if a dispute should arise between the 
parties or if the licensee breaches the license and infringes the patent. 
In the foregoing hypothetical, if the ex ante search or bargaining costs 
are deemed too high relative to the value of the transaction, the licensor 
may either enter the transaction without fully incurring such costs or forgo 
entering into the transaction.  If the licensor enters the transaction without 
fully incurring such ex ante costs, the licensor is likely to incur potentially 
high ex post transaction risk and enforcement costs.  By entering the 
transaction without incurring the attending ex ante search and bargaining 
costs, the parties (or at least always one party) accept risk insufficiently 
evaluated, which increases the risk of the transaction’s value degrading at 
some unforeseen time in the future.  If the licensor foregoes entering the 
transaction at all in light of high transaction costs, both parties and the 
market in which they were to collaborate suffer lost opportunity costs.  In 
either scenario, the licensor has engaged in sub-optimal commercial 
activity because the outcome in each case is economically inefficient.92 
 
inefficient transactions through informed or more equitable bargaining and decision-making.  It seems 
intuitively obvious that transactions based on inadequate or bad information are likely to be much less 
efficient than transactions based on adequate or good information).  Transaction parties tend to 
voluntarily incur some ex ante search and bargaining transaction costs to acquire information about the 
object of the transaction and negotiate particular contract terms perceived as favorable to them based on 
that information.  For example, in an acquisition transaction the acquiring firm performs due diligence 
of the target company, which adds to the cost of the transaction (by requiring expenditure of time and 
resources) but helps the acquiring firm to evaluate whether the target company is a desirable candidate 
for acquisition. 
91 See Posner, Transaction Costs, supra note 82, at 325; Lars Meyer, Soft Law for Solid Contracts? 
A Comparative Analysis of the Value of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law to the Process of Contract Law 
Harmonization, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 119, 123 (2006) (noting that “businesses . . . are most 
interested in the reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs”). 
92 Of course, the licensor might rationally incrementally forego incurring ex ante or ex post 
transaction costs if the marginal cost of increased due diligence of the licensee or protracted negotiation 
of certain issues, or enforcing the IP right, is less likely to yield useful information or advantage relative 
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Viewed through a Coasean prism, high transaction costs can be a 
threat to the ability of the market to allocate IP to those participants that 
value it the most.93  Under the Coase theorem, the higher the cost the less 
likely the IP exchange transaction will be made.94  And furthermore, in the 
OBI context, if the transaction costs of collaborative innovation in open 
networks are high, the parties are less likely to engage in such collaborative 
efforts, which threaten the viability of the open business innovation model. 
 
B.  Territoriality of IP Rights Increase Transaction Costs to Firms 
 
In international IP exchange, private parties face high transaction 
costs.95  Ex ante costs can be high due to the breadth of national IP law 
regimes, the frequent lack of transparency of the IP laws of those regimes, 
and the difficulty associated with penetrating that opacity.  These factors, 
thus, increase the cost of search and bargaining.96  Ex post costs are high as 
a result of the attending uncertainty and unpredictability of legal outcomes 
arising from the inherently dynamic nature of IP rights and the territorial 
nature of IP laws.97  Moreover, IP exchanges can be particularly susceptible 
to state intervention for public policy reasons, thus impeding private 
parties’ ability to strike efficient bargains at minimized transaction costs.98 
IP laws vary between different sovereign jurisdictions.  The legal 
nature, scope, subject matter, level of protection, and enforcement of IP 
rights can differ significantly on a country-by-country basis.99  A number of 
 
to transaction value. 
93 See Posner, Transaction Costs, supra note 82, at 327.  See also Ashish Arora & Andrea Fosfuri, 
Licensing The Market For Technology, 52 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 277, 279 (2003) (positing that 
reducing transaction costs leads to more licensing transactions). 
94 See Posner, Transaction Costs, supra note 82, at 325 (noting that “the higher [the transaction 
cost], the less likely the transaction is to be made”). 
95 See Wagner, supra note 83, at 1 (noting that legal diversity imposes high costs on enterprises 
doing business in more than one jurisdictions and raises barriers to market entry); Meyer, supra note 91, 
at 121 (diversity in contract law across jurisdictions leads to legal uncertainty and financial risk in 
cross-border transactions which create high transaction costs for parties). 
96 Meyer, supra note 91, at 121. 
97 See Posner, Transaction Costs, supra note 82, at 325 (explaining IP’s unique characteristics of 
invisibility, ready appropriability, and divisibility). 
98 IP regimes are viewed as policy-based economic legislations that confer exclusive rights based 
on assessments of legal rules that will produce the greatest economic good for society as a whole.  In 
the United States, the theoretical justification for granting IP rights is utilitarian in that they are 
recognized as policy tools to foster innovation and ensure fair competition in the marketplace.  In some 
other countries such as France, the theoretical justification may instead be based on natural rights 
arguments.  See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: 
The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 715, 767 (2009) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, 
The Demise of Territoriality]. 
99 See generally Sonia Baldia, Intellectual Property in Global Sourcing: The Art of the Transfer, 38 
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judicial doctrines that facilitate the transactional aspects of IP rights, 
whether rooted in statutory or common law (e.g., ownership, licensing, sale 
or use of IP rights such as the “work for hire,” “shop rights,” “joint 
ownership,” “fair use,” “experimental use,” “first sale exhaustion,” and 
“compulsory licensing”), differ significantly in scope, permissible range of 
exceptions, interpretation, and application depending on the implicated IP 
regime.100  Also, permissible licensing practices, conflicts with competition 
law, and treatment of IP licenses in bankruptcy in various jurisdictions can 
differ significantly, thereby creating uncertainty and unpredictability as to 
legal outcomes under implicated IP regimes.101  These differences among 
IP regimes can also range across a spectrum from obvious, apparent upon 
due diligence, subtle, or even nuanced based again on a host of possible 
jurisprudential, political, economic, social, and even cultural factors, and 
thus contribute further to the opacity inherent in international IP 
exchanges.102  Consider a transaction involving international collaboration 
among geographically dispersed parties.  In such a transaction, the diverse 
IP laws of implicated regimes can lead to the recognition of different 
persons as originators and right holders in different jurisdictions with 
regard to the same object of IP, creating fragmented ownership issues as to 
the collaborative outputs. 
This legal diversity is deeply rooted in the principles of territoriality 
and independence of rights enshrined in the public international IP law.103  
 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 499 (2007) (discussing differences in IP laws in India, China, and other countries in the 
context of IP transfer).  In the United States, for example, both federal law and almost all state laws 
expressly recognize the existence of trade secrets and provide statutory protections against their 
misappropriation.  India law does not recognize trade secrets, however, and English law occupies a less 
defined middle legal ground on whether a trade secret classifies as IP or merely an inclusive category of 
confidential information. 
100 See, e.g., Baldia, supra note 99. 
101 Id. 
102 Ownership and allocation issues with respect to IP rights are at the heart of IP exchanges 
involving collaborative innovation.  Each jurisdiction has adopted its own set of legal rules (whether 
statutory or judicially created) based on equity or other public policy reasons.  For example, default fair 
use rules are enacted to correct market failures that may arise from granting exclusive rights to 
copyright authors and owners or to lower transaction costs of obtaining consents from right holders, 
where such costs may be so high that a property rights regime would prevent parties from reaching an 
agreement.  The U.S. Copyright Act contains provisions permitting “fair use” of copyrighted works 
without obtaining the copyright owner’s consent where such use is exempt from infringing conduct.  
The doctrine relative to employee inventions, shop rights, and compulsory licensing rules are other 
examples of the default rules that lower transaction costs or correct market failures.  See supra note 84 
and accompanying text. 
103 See Dinwoodie, The Demise of Territoriality, supra note 98, at 713 (noting the multilateral 
treaties that are at the foundation of public international IP law).  The principles of national treatment, 
which arguably implicate the notion of territoriality of IP rights, are enshrined in Article 2(1) of the 
Paris Convention, Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, and Article 3 of TRIPS Agreement. 
BALDIA_FINAL_34.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/14 9:23 PM 





The principle of territoriality, which is closely intertwined with the concept 
of sovereignty, implies that IP laws of a jurisdiction are nationally limited 
in application such that any exclusive rights granted by a jurisdiction to an 
IP right holder can only be exercised within the borders of such jurisdiction 
granting the rights.104  Furthermore, the independence of rights principle 
implies that an IP right granted or denied to an IP right holder by one 
jurisdiction does not obligate any another jurisdiction to do so within its 
borders.105  The nature and scope of IP rights in different countries can also 
modulate depending on a host of jurisprudential, social, political, and 
economic factors.106  New innovation paradigms and increasing cross-
border IP-related commercial activities, including the production, 
exploitation, and infringement of IP rights in global markets, have 
subjected longstanding public international IP law principles to increasing 
doubts as to their ability to withstand the commercial realities of 21st 
century IP markets.107 
Accordingly, parties to an international IP exchange that implicates 
multiple regimes can find themselves in an unpredictable legal environment 
relative to their respective IP rights, which increases legal risk for the 
parties and thereby decreases transaction value.  To offset legal risk 
flowing from unpredictability, parties must strike efficient bargains through 
informed risk evaluation and allocations in transaction design ex ante and 
enforcement ex post.  The transaction costs of acquiring information for 
informed bargaining, however, can be very high due to the complexity, 
variance, and territoriality of IP rights and the vast legal diversity in IP 
regimes.  Foregoing such transaction costs can create inefficiencies in the 
context of negotiations, ownership allocation, ownership disputes, 
infringement actions, enforceability challenges, loss of control over 
licensed IP, validity challenges, and clouded title, among other scenarios. 
 
104 Dinwoodie, The Demise of Territoriality, supra note 98, at 767; Anita Frohlich, Copyright 
Infringement in the Internet Age—Primetime for Harmonized Conflict-of-Law Rules? 24 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 851 (2009); Richard Fentiman, Choice of Law and Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: HEADING FOR THE FUTURE 129, 137 (Josef Drexl & 
Annette Kur eds., 2005). 
105 Dinwoodie, The Demise of Territoriality, supra note 98.  See also Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property arts. 4bis(1), 6(3), Sept. 28, 1979, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; 
Berne Convention art. 5(2) (the 1979 amended version does not appear in U.N.T.S. or I.L.M.). 
106 For instance, countries with different socio-economic conditions might optimize the production 
of knowledge through different mechanisms or calibrations of incentives.  See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, 
Private Ordering and the Creation of International Copyright Norms: The Role of Public Structuring, 
160 J. OF INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 161 (2004) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, Public 
Structuring]. 
107 See, e.g., Dinwoodie, Public Structuring, supra note 106 (critiquing the territoriality approach to 
IP laws in light of changing economic realities). 
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Ultimately, the individual and collective differential among IP 
regimes can lead to significant variance in risk, reward, and unanticipated 
outcome for IP owners and users, and it severely undermines the legal 
rights of parties to international IP exchange.  This places significant 
transaction costs on the transaction parties and raises barriers to entry in 
foreign markets.  The relative lack of IP regime transparency (in nature, 
scope, and application), and ensuing substantial transaction costs of private 
legal actors’ ex ante diligence into potentially applicable laws within not 
only known but also potentially implicated IP regimes, creates an 
inefficient international IP exchange platform, and diminishes private 
assessment, allocation, and management of IP-related risk in IP exchanges. 
 
C.  Lack of Harmonized Public or Private International Law Rules 
on Cross-Border Transactional Aspects of IP Rights 
 
There is, of course, a substantial framework of public international IP 
law,108 but that framework is limited in scope and does not provide for a 
uniform or harmonized set of international legal rules designed to facilitate 
international IP exchanges.  Indeed, several international IP treaties among 
nation states, such as the WTO-TRIPS Agreement,109 attempt to harmonize 
the substantive IP laws at the international level in response to the growing 
need for legal convergence as markets become global.110  The role of such 
treaties, however, has been limited to establishing a mandated “harmonized 
floor” rather than imposing or creating conditions for uniformity of IP law 
across the member countries.111 
More specifically, these treaties establish certain minimum 
substantive standards as to the scope of IP rights in member countries and 
streamline the process for procuring IP rights in multiple jurisdictions, with 
the aim of providing predictability with respect to the standards of IP 
 
108 See Dinwoodie, The Demise of Territoriality, supra note 98, at 713. 
109 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter 
WTO-TRIPS Agreement]. 
110 These treaties dating back to the industrial era were configured to encourage the trade of IP-
based goods and the local production of knowledge in member states, but they failed to keep pace with 
current IP market realities which increasingly involve trade in IP itself. 
111 J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the 
TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L LAW 345, 345–88 (1995) (describing different 
approaches to interest balancing amongst member states); Denis Borges Barbosa et al., The 
International Intellectual Property Regime Complex: Slouching Towards Development in International 
Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 71, 127 (2007); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Role of India, 
China, Brazil and Other Emerging Economies in Establishing Access Norms for Intellectual Property 
and Intellectual Property Lawmaking 4 (N.Y.U. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 09-53, 2009). 
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protection and enforcement in member states.112  These treaties do not 
intrude upon the national sovereignty of the member states.113  Rather, they 
effectively preserve substantial autonomy for states to craft domestic IP 
law and policy.114  Initial efforts have also been made to try to harmonize 
private international law for trans-border IP disputes to provide degrees of 
uniformity and legal certainty with respect to issues such as jurisdiction, 
conflicts of laws, and the mechanisms of enforcement of IP-related 
judgments, but these efforts have stalled in international fora.115 
Thus, while existing international IP treaties serve an important role in 
providing a platform for continued international dialogue and some 
predictability (albeit a low level) as to the scope of IP rights available in 
member states, they do not meaningfully address any transactional aspects 
of IP rights that arise when private parties seek to commercialize IP in 
global markets.116  As a result, despite these harmonizing efforts, vast legal 
diversity exists with respect to regimes’ respective IP laws.117  
Globalization and growing trade in IP have reignited the international IP 
debate on the appropriate balance between universal rules and national 
autonomy.118  But given the extremely divergent national interests, 
development, and political agendas of states, international consensus 
remains elusive.119 
 
IV.  THE TRANSACTION COST PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL 
IP EXCHANGE 
 
An international IP exchange may involve the transfer, sharing, 
acquisition, commercialization, or creation of IP rights by and between two 
 
112 For example, the WTO-TRIPS Agreement requires its member states to provide patent 
protection for inventive developments in all fields of technology, sets minimum term or protection and 
minimum rights, and further restricts compulsory licensing.  See WTO-TRIPS Agreement arts. 27–31; 
supra note 14 (PCT). 
113 See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Multilateral Agreements and Policy Opportunities (2008), available 
at http://policydialogue.org/files/events/Correa_Multilateral_Agreements_and_Policy_Opportunities.pdf; 
Dreyfuss, supra note 111, at 6–7. 
114 See Correa, supra note 113. 
115 See infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
116 See Dreyfuss, supra note 111 (explaining that the WTO-TRIPS Agreement creates rights for 
producers but says little about the rights of users). 
117 For a comparative discussion of substantive trade secret and copyright law in Switzerland, 
China, and Japan, relative to the minimum standards under the WTO-TRIPS Agreement, see Jacques de 
Werra, What Legal Framework for Promoting the Cross-Border Flow of Intellectual Assets (Trade 
Secrets and Music)? A View from Europe Towards Asia (China and Japan), 1 INTELL. PROP. Q. 27 
(2009). 
118 See Dinwoodie, The Demise of Territoriality, supra note 98; Dreyfuss, supra note 111. 
119 Dreyfuss, supra note 111. 
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or more affiliated or unaffiliated entities geographically dispersed in 
multiple jurisdictions.120  IP rights may be created, transferred, distributed, 
waived, released, licensed, leased, sold, or otherwise exchanged.  In such 
exchanges, private parties rely on private ordering and traditional IP norms 
to organize their relationships, protect and allocate IP rights, and capture 
value from IP.121 
In an OBI environment, for example, firms leverage formal contracts 
and IP rights to protect and share their innovative capabilities in 
collaborative networks.122  IP rights are viewed as efficiency enhancing 
tools because they facilitate knowledge exchange between OBI firms by 
defining and delineating property rights in the intangible inputs and outputs 
of OBI, independent of contractual relationships.123  Indeed, an OBI firm 
may be more inclined to collaborate with multiple partners and feel less 
threatened by appropriability hazard if the proprietary knowledge it intends 
to share with a third party is protected by a patent because a patent right is 
legally enforceable against a third party infringer independent of any 
contractual protections.124  Furthermore, contracts are used as devices to 
calibrate “openness” and manage and allocate IP rights amongst diverse 
parties.125  For example, such contracts are used to define IP ownership, 
 
120 See Baldia, supra note 99. 
121 See F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, Engineering a Deal: Toward a Private Ordering Solution 
to the Anticommons Problem, 48 B.C. L. REV. 111, 115 (2007) (describing private ordering “to refer to 
circumstances where parties, given extant legal and regulatory regimes, order the substance of their 
affairs and transactions as they see fit and resort to the judicial system of enforcement”); see also 
Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property 
Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 849 (1998) (citing ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 
(7th Cir. 1996) in noting that IP law grants legally enforceable exclusive property rights to right-holders 
that are “good against the world” whereas contract law provides the freedom to bargain away such 
exclusive property rights, and such bargains are good only against the other contracting party); Maureen 
A. O’Rourke, Rethinking Remedies at the Intersection of Intellectual Property and Contract: Toward a 
Unified Body of Law, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (1997). 
122 See generally John Hagedoorn & Ann-Kristin Ridder, Open Innovation, Contracts and 
Intellectual Property Rights: An Exploratory Empirical Study (United Nations Univ., Working Paper 
No. 2012-025, 2012), available at http://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/wppdf/2012/wp2012-025.pdf.  
Based on empirical data, the authors find that active open innovation firms have a strong preference for 
governing their relationships through formal contracts and view IP rights as highly relevant to the 
protection of their innovative capabilities. 
123 See generally Nimmer, supra note 121. 
124 See CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 172 (noting that in a closed innovation 
model, patents might allow Intel to entice rivals into cross licensing arrangements). 
125 Id.  See also HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN BUSINESS MODELS: HOW TO THRIVE IN THE NEW 
INNOVATION LANDSCAPE (2006) (explaining that open innovation can be too open and there is a risk of 
appropriation of innovative efforts by others).  Open innovation firms also use other information 
governance mechanisms to protect and manage their proprietary knowledge and information, a 
discussion of which is outside the scope of this paper.  IP theft is cited as the biggest risk in 
collaborative innovation, particularly involving international partners.  Therefore, confidentiality and 
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exclusivity, and other commercial terms and contingencies that govern 
inter-organizational relationships, as well as coordinate and control 
cooperative innovation processes and capabilities.  In OBI, therefore, IP 
rights and contracts supplement and complement each other.126 
As IP markets globalize and the innovation paradigm becomes 
increasingly collaborative, traditional IP norms and private ordering 
regimes have failed to keep pace with changing market realities.127  To 
offset legal uncertainty emanating from territorial IP rights, international 
transaction parties resort to private ordering through contracts to define 
each party’s rights and obligations vis-à-vis the transacted IP.128  Such 
contracts in international transactions are, however, imperfect legal devices 
to mitigate legal uncertainty because contracts are inherently incomplete 
and the private international IP law rules are un-harmonized across 
jurisdictions, subjecting IP exchange transactions to the risks inherent in IP 
territoriality.  Indeed, the problem is acute within a dynamic and fluid 
international OBI environment with heterogeneous actors having 
potentially conflicting interests and ill-defined visibility ex ante into 
cooperative inputs and outputs.129 
 
A.  Transactional Inefficiency Due to Incomplete Contracts and 
Unpredictability of Legal Outcome 
 
Contracts are inherently incomplete for a number of reasons, 
including the high transaction cost of contracting.130  The high transaction 
cost of performing due diligence, negotiating, and drafting a complete 
contract ex ante that anticipates all contingencies and efficiently allocates 
risk (assuming that were possible) almost certainly outweighs the benefits 
to contracting parties.131  As a result, bounded rationality can lead the 
 
exclusivity agreements are central to collaborative innovation.  See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, 
ECONOMIST, SHARING THE IDEA: THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL INNOVATION NETWORKS 2, 14 (2007). 
126 See Nimmer, supra note 121, at 829–30, 844. 
127 This is because the traditional IP norms dating back to the industrial era are more geared 
towards a linear centralized innovation model.  See Sawyer, supra note 11. 
128 See Meyer, supra note 91, at 120 (explaining that “a contract is perhaps the most essential 
fundament of a successful transaction” on an international level). 
129 Such actors may be individuals, public or private firms, investors, suppliers, customers, non-
profit or educational entities, or government agencies.  See OECD, OPEN INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 
21. 
130 See generally Avery W. Katz, Contractual Incompleteness: A Transactional Perspective, 56 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 169 (2005); Ian Ayers & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
131 Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL. J. ECON. 466, 468 (1980) 
(“[B]ecause of the costs involved in enumerating and bargaining over contractual obligations under the 
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parties to ignore contingencies that have low probability of occurrence 
notwithstanding the magnitude of their effect if they do occur.132 
Parties also might inadvertently or ignorantly leave contingencies and 
issues unresolved and assume thereby additional ex post risk.  Moreover, 
parties with informational advantage may deliberately leave the contract 
open or engage in rent seeking strategic incompleteness.  Thus, incomplete 
contracts can impose transactional inefficiency due to “hold-up” risk and 
opportunism.133 
Indeed, international parties face classic problems associated with 
incomplete and asymmetric information due to legal diversity across 
jurisdictions.134  Parties therefore may negotiate in ignorance of the 
applicable legal rules or in the shadow of such rules where one party is 
systematically better informed than the other party.135  In either case, at 
least one party to the transaction is likely to be inefficiently positioned 
relative to the substantive law risk applicable to the contractual 
relationship.136 
The doctrine of contract incompleteness as applied to the international 
IP exchange contract implies that numerous issues related to the parties’ 
respective IP rights and expectations are always left unaddressed in the 
contract.  The degree of incompleteness can vary but because of perceived 
high transaction costs or insufficient issue awareness, parties may forego 
transaction appropriate ex ante search and bargaining efforts, and instead 
rely on a mutually acceptable choice of state law provision in their contract 
and thus accept the proposition that the contractually selected body of 
governing state law shall serve as an acceptable and reliable default source 
of law to address ex post contingencies and disputes involving the parties.  
Parties may further rely on the contractual inclusion of a forum and venue 
 
full range of relevant contingencies, it is normally impractical to make contracts which approach 
completeness.”). 
132 See Katz, supra note 130, at 172–73.  
133 See Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual 
Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 580 (2007) (citing Williamson on the 
problem of transaction costs in incomplete contracts). 
134 Many articles in economic literature have examined contract theory where asymmetric 
information creates problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, which lead to inefficient contracts.  
See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Roger B. Myerson, Mechanism Design by an Informed 
Principal, 51 ECONOMETRICA 1767 (1983); ABLA M. ABDEL-LATIF & JEFFREY B. NUGENT, EXPORT 
PROMOTION POLICIES: TRANSACTION COSTS AND EXPORT CHANNEL CHOICES IN EGYPT 1–5 (1995) 
(describing the transaction cost problem of asymmetric information in international marketing by 
Egyptian exports of manufactured goods). 
135 See Ayers & Gertner, supra note 130, at 95. 
136 Kathleen Patchel, Choice of Law and Software Licenses: A Framework for Discussion, 26 
BROOK J. INT’L L. 117, 123–24 (2000); Wagner, supra note 83, at 3. 
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selection provision, which identifies the parties’ mutually-agreed upon type 
of adjudicative body to resolve their disputes (e.g., arbitration vs. court) 
and preferred geographical location of such a body.137 
Importantly, the choice of state law provision is positioned to perform 
a “gap filling” function and address incompleteness on an ex post basis, 
thus theoretically imposing a degree of bounded legal certainty with respect 
to future issues that arise relative to the contract that are not expressly 
addressed, or clearly implied, in the contract’s express provisions.138  The 
parties’ chosen state law is therefore intended to supplement the contract 
with issues that the parties did not bargain for or reduce to writing, and 
provide the “default rules” or jus dispositivum for gap filling.139 
Party autonomy in choice of law is a widely accepted private 
international law principle.140  However, the principle of party autonomy is 
not harmonized across jurisdictions in scope or application.141  Some 
jurisdictions give full force and effect to parties’ choice of law applicable 
to their transaction.142  Other jurisdictions may impose meaningful 
limitations on the scope or application of parties’ chosen law or altogether 
ignore the chosen law’s application, perhaps for public policy reasons, thus 
depriving the parties of legal certainty.143  Indeed a large number of legal 
 
137 Choice of state law and choice of court or arbitration clauses are widely utilized in international 
commercial contracts.  See generally HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, CONSOLIDATED 
VERSION OF PREPARATORY WORK LEADING TO THE DRAFT HAGUE PRINCIPLES ON THE CHOICE OF 
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (2012) [hereinafter HAGUE PREPARATORY WORK]. 
138 Erin Ann O’Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual Choice of 
Law, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1549, 1559 (2000) (discussing the use of choice-of-law clauses and observing 
that courts and tribunals routinely observe them).  In the absence of a contractual choice of law clause, 
U.S. courts employ the traditional “most significant relationship” analysis to determine which 
substantive law governs a contract.  For instance, New York’s conflict rules apply the “most significant 
relationship” test.  See Stephens v. American Home Assur. Co., 811 F. Supp. 937, 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971); ALI PRINCIPLES OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY § 315 (2008). 
139 The term jus dispositivum means “the law adopted by consent.”  Jus Dispositivum Law & Legal 
Definition, US LEGAL, http://definitions.uslegal.com/j/jus-dispositivum (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
140 See HAGUE PREPARATORY WORK, supra note 137.  The principle of party autonomy states that 
the law chosen by the parties shall govern a contract.  It is enshrined in a number of international and 
regional conventions including the Hague Conventions on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (December 22, 1986), the Law Applicable to Agency (March 14, 1978), 
and Article 3(1) of the Rome I Regulation, as well as in the domestic laws of many countries such as 
Taiwan, China, Japan, Korea, and Switzerland.  The U.C.C. and Restatement (Second) on Conflict of 
Laws also reflect the principle of party autonomy in the United States. 
141 See HAGUE PREPARATORY WORK, supra note 137. 
142 Canada is one such country.  See Barry Leon & Graham Reynolds, A Canadian Perspective: 
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 18 INT’L L. PRACTICUM 130 (2005).  Other examples include 
Chile, Venezuela, and Mexico, among other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., M.M. Albornoz, Choice of Law in 
International Contracts in Latin American Legal System, 6 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 23 (2010). 
143 Some Latin American and Middle Eastern jurisdictions do not recognize party autonomy in 
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systems specify rules in varying degree and scope that may not be 
derogated from by way of contract, referred to as “mandatory rules” or jus 
cogens.144  These rules are perhaps the most important limitation to the 
principle of party autonomy.145  Furthermore, some jurisdictions either 
require a connection or relationship between the parties or the transaction 
and the chosen law,146 or they severely limit or even exclude such choices 
for contracts involving certain subject matters such as foreign investment, 
public procurement, employment, competition law, and intellectual 
property law.147 
The implication of mandatory rules and other limitations on party 
autonomy (notwithstanding the parties’ chosen state law) can result in the 
application of legal rules of one or more implicated regimes in part or 
entirely depending on the adjudicating forum, thus leading to the risk of 
unintended dépeçage.148  That said, party autonomy can be protected and 
 
choice of law.  See Albornoz, supra note 142 (noting Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, and Uruguay as 
jurisdictions that reject the principle of party autonomy); Dana Stringer, Choice of Law and Choice of 
Forum in Brazilian International Commercial Contracts: Party Autonomy, International Jurisdiction, 
and the Emerging Third Way, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 959, 960 (2006) (Brazil rejects party 
autonomy in commercial contract litigation, therefore severely limiting the role of choice of law and 
forum clauses except when combined with arbitration). 
144 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shewai Minshi Guanxi Falu Shiyong Fa (中华人民共和国
涉外民事关系法律适用法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Laws Applicable to 
Foreign-Related Civil Relations] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 
2010, effective Apr. 1, 2011) art. 4 (China), translated in Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Laws Applicable to Foreign-Related Civil Relations, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Jan. 12, 2011) (requiring the 
application of Chinese overriding mandatory provisions against the parties’ choice of law); HAGUE 
PREPARATORY WORK, supra note 137, at 7.  Applicable rules may be statutory or rooted in common 
law.  Certain legal rules may be immutable in that they govern even if parties try to contract around 
them.  Immutable rules of implicated jurisdictions are generally driven by public policies and can create 
conflicting outcomes.  Parties have little choice as such rules cannot be contracted away, but parties 
may find other ways to avoid such mandatory rules such as by altering the transaction structure or 
avoiding “unfavorable” jurisdictions all together, provided they know of such rules upfront.  For a 
general analysis of the concepts of immutable and default rules, see Ayers & Gertner, supra note 130, at 
87.  Another example is the duty to act in good faith under the Uniform Commercial Code, which is an 
immutable rule that parties cannot waive by agreement.  For default rules in the international context, 
see Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 671 (1999); Karin L. 
Kizer, Minding the Gap: Determining Interest Rates Under the U.N. Convention for the International 
Sale of Goods, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1279 (1998); Nimmer, supra note 121, at 853–60 (discussing the 
transactional default rules that IP law creates). 
145 Kizer, supra note 144.  Such mandatory rules may arise not only under national laws but also at 
the regional level due to increasing economic regional integration. 
146 See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, FEASIBILITY STUDY ON THE CHOICE OF LAW 
IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS: REPORT ON WORK CARRIED OUT AND PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
5–6 (2007) (citing examples of U.S. and Poland). 
147 Id. 
148 National courts and arbitral tribunals may supplant parties’ chosen law with applicable 
mandatory laws and public policy rules.  See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, 
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enhanced by expanded coverage and precision within the expressed terms 
of the contract, meaning a reduced scope of reliance on the choice of state 
law provision to address unexpressed contingencies.  This expanded 
coverage (i.e., a more complete contract) specifically indicates the parties’ 
intent, and thereby reduces the risk of non-enforcement so long as the 
parties can be aware of, and avoid conflict with, mandatory rules of 
potentially implicated jurisdictions.149 
Transactional efficiency and contractual value depend on the parties 
making informed tradeoffs in transactional planning, design, and 
completion.  Parties should have detailed information about a number of 
factors relative to the transaction, including the legal rules that may apply 
should parties engage in negotiated dispute resolution or seek judicial 
intervention for contract interpretation.150  Because of the interplay between 
contract incompleteness and the principle of territoriality in IP, however, 
parties to international IP transactions have poor ex ante visibility as to 
which default or mandatory rules may be implicated in their transaction in 
the event of any ex post contingency or dispute notwithstanding any 
selected state law provision. 
If parties have ex ante transparency and predictability as to the 
applicable legal rules, parties may supplant such rules by contract to the 
extent permissible or otherwise engineer their transactions to mitigate 
adverse impact and enhance party autonomy.  The transaction costs of due 
diligence, investigation, and acquisition of useful predictive information, 
with respect to implicated legal regimes to inform ex ante bargaining to 
create more complete contracts, can be quite substantial and even 
prohibitive in the international context, however.151  Indeed, parties 
effectively reduce ex ante transaction costs in proportion to the extent they 
rely on their governing state law provision as a substitute for searching and 
bargaining with respect to particular IP-related issues.  In so doing, the 
parties take on undefined risk and thus defer the transaction costs of that 
risk to ex post realization, in which case the transaction costs become 
unknown as opposed to quantifiable ex ante costs of search and bargain. 
 
FEASIBILITY STUDY ON THE CHOICE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS: SPECIAL FOCUS ON 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2007) [hereinafter HAGUE ARBITRATION STUDY].  Dépeçage refers to 
“a single contract which provides that different parts of the contract shall be governed by different 
laws,” such as the chosen law and mandatory rules of one or more jurisdictions.  Dépeçage Law & 
Legal Definition, US LEGAL, http://definitions.uslegal.com/d/depecage (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
149 See Wagner, supra note 83, at 3 (noting that “it is only possible to contract around the default 
rules and to avoid mandatory rules . . . if the parties know what those rules are”). 
150 See generally Richard Craswell, The “Incomplete Contracts” Literature and Efficient 
Precautions, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 151 (2005). 
151 See, e.g., ABDEL-LATIF & NUGENT, supra note 134, at 1–5. 
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To the point, reliance on ex post enforcement pursuant to a selected 
governing state law to ensure contract completion or compliance with the 
bargain can impose substantial, and even extreme, deferred transaction 
costs, which routinely demand inefficient private settlement of disputes.  
To be sure, transactional efficiency requires the balancing of costs against 
benefits.  Additionally, in some instances, the upfront cost of investigating 
applicable legal rules and writing more complete contracts may not be 
justified if the contingencies covered are immaterial in magnitude or 
sufficiently remote in terms of risk of occurrence.152  On the other hand, the 
high enforcement cost of contingencies may justify the ex ante 
investigation cost.  But in each instance, the need for transparency with 
respect to the likely ex ante or ex post transaction costs is a required 
element of this balancing analysis. 
Parties must be able to perceive the contingencies and make decisions 
on whether and how to address such contingencies ex ante in order to 
effectively assess search and bargain efficiency and consequential ex post 
risk, but the necessary legal framework to permit that analysis is overtly 
lacking in today’s international IP markets.  Stated differently, if in cross-
border IP transactions parties had greater visibility and understanding of 
the implicated IP contingencies and applicable legal rules, parties could 
more effectively identify, unbundle, and allocate risk and costs in an 
agreeable manner that enhances legal predictability and facilitates 
transactional efficiency. 
 
B.  IP Territoriality and Ineffectual Contractual Choice of State Law 
 
As discussed supra,153 choice of state law provisions in contract may 
be used to forego ex ante search and bargain transaction costs to the extent 
the parties rely on the provision as a gap filling default instrument; 
however, such an instrument is particularly blunt in the context of 
international IP exchange and OBI.154  The functionality and effectiveness 
of these traditional governing state law provisions in contracts in the role of 
“gap filling” is highly suspect with respect to IP-related issues in cross-
border IP exchange transactions.  Because of the principle of territoriality 
and the lack of harmonization of private international IP law rules, the 
parties’ selected governing state law may be superseded or overridden by 
 
152 Such investments may make more sense in high value transactions or for repeat players who can 
amortize the costs over multiple related transactions.  See Katz, supra note 130, at 178. 
153 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
154 See generally Wagner, supra note 83, at 3 (“Rather than decreasing the costs of contracting, 
choice of law may rather add a considerable sum to the bill.”). 
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legal rules of other implicated jurisdictions in the course of dispute 
resolution ex post.155  The choice of state law provision thus is not an 
inherently reliable instrument of predictability with respect to the resolution 
of disputes between parties involving cross-border IP-related disputes in 
international IP exchange transactions. 
Inherent in any cross-border IP exchange transaction is the risk that 
the parties’ chosen state law may not supplant or block otherwise 
applicable substantive IP laws of implicated jurisdictions.156  While courts 
in many jurisdictions do recognize and enforce choice of law provisions 
with respect to resolving contract terms and obligations under lex 
contractus principles,157 disputed issues between contract parties that relate 
to the nature and scope of IP rights themselves (such as registration, 
existence, initial ownership, validity, attributes, transferability, duration, 
infringement, remedies, or effects against third parties of IP rights, whether 
or not registered) remain largely subject to the IP laws of implicated 
jurisdictions under lex protectionis principles because of the “territorial” 
legal nature of IP rights.158  In other words, while general contractual rights 
are typically broadly recognized and enforceable, IP rights can be subject 
to the domestic policies underlying such laws. 
Accordingly, in an IP-related dispute between international 
 
155 Recognizing the problem of un-harmonized private international law rules as a source of 
inefficiency in cross border transactions, in November 2012 The Hague Convention for Private 
International Law promulgated the Draft Hague Principles on the Choice of Law in International 
Contracts, which sets forth general principles concerning choice of law in international commercial 
contracts and affirms the principle of party autonomy with limited exceptions.  It remains to be seen 
how widely these guiding principles will be adopted by nation states.  In governing law contract 
provisions, parties routinely attempt to address this particular contingency of the selected law’s choice 
of law rules determining that another jurisdiction’s law should apply by expressly stating that the 
selected governing law’s choice of law rule shall not be applied or considered. 
156 The effects of choice of law provisions may further be confined by other non-IP related 
“mandatory” legal rules of implicated jurisdictions depending on the nature and scope of the 
transaction, as well as the IP that is the subject of the transaction from which the parties may not 
derogate by contract.  Examples include technology import and export regulations, competition law, 
foreign exchange, product liability, corporate structure, and foreign direct investment rules, to name a 
few.  For a discussion of regulatory constraints in cross-border exchange of IP, see Werra, supra note 
117, at 37–42. 
157 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 187 (1971) (allowing the parties to choose 
the law that will govern their contractual rights and duties, subject to certain restrictions); AM. L. INST., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS 
IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES 216 (2007) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] (“The law chosen by the 
parties applies to contractual issues such as the common will and intent of the parties, its existence, its 
interpretation, its effects, avoidance and termination of the contract, warranties, guarantees, 
consequences of a material breach such as the duty to put on notice to remedy it, contractual damages 
and accounting for lost profits, confidentiality, best-efforts clause, or the status of affiliated companies 
and subsidiaries.”). 
158 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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transactional parties, one must consider not only the choice of state law 
rules for resolving issues of contract interpretation but also the domestic IP 
laws of implicated jurisdictions for resolving IP-related issues (including 
any conflict-of-law issues).159  This distinction between contractual issues 
and non-contractual IP-related issues in IP exchanges is endemic but not 
always clear since these issues can be closely intertwined and lead to 
difficult issue characterization questions and conflicting solutions.160 
Consider the following hypothetical: A U.S. automobile manufacturer 
hires a Japanese software programmer to design and develop simulation 
software for navigation in automobiles.  The underlying contract between 
the parties is negotiated and executed in the United States and (i) stipulates 
that the software be “work for hire” owned by the U.S. firm, (ii) expressly 
selects New York law to govern (i.e., essentially be the default rules), and 
(iii) identifies the exclusive jurisdiction of the New York courts to 
adjudicate any disputes between them.  Soon after the software is 
developed and delivered by the Japanese programmer, the U.S. firm 
markets the software in the United States, Germany, and Japan and applies 
for patents on the software in each of the three jurisdictions.  A dispute 
subsequently arises between the parties as to the ownership of the IP rights 
in the software and the pending patent applications.  The Japanese 
programmer sues the U.S. firm in Japan seeking a declaratory judgment 
with respect to the programmer’s ownership of IP rights in the software and 
the U.S. firm’s infringement of the programmer’s IP rights.  This dispute 
presents at least the following legal issues: (i) which party owns the IP 
rights to the newly created software—the Japanese programmer or the U.S. 
firm, (ii) whether the IP rights in the software were transferred to the U.S. 
firm by contract or by operation of law, and (iii) if the transfer is invalid, 
whether the U.S. firm is infringing on the Japanese programmer’s IP rights 
in the software. 
Having chosen New York law as the governing law ex ante, can the 
U.S. firm firmly rely on New York law to govern the issues in dispute 
resolution in all possible implicated fora?  The answer will depend on the 
 
159 See Paul L.C. Torremans, License and Assignments of Intellectual Property Rights Under the 
Rome I Regulation, J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 397, 398–99 (2008); Patchel, supra note 136, at 149–51 
(explaining that a publishing contract not only sets forth the obligations of the author and the publisher 
but also provides for the grant of the right of reproduction and distribution of the work); Corcovado 
Music Corp. v. Hollis Music, Inc., 981 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1993); Campbell Connelly & Co. v. Noble, 
(1963) 1 W.L.R. 252 (Eng. Ch. 1962) (holding that U.S. copyright law applies to determine 
assignability of renewal term but English contract law determines whether the assignment was correctly 
effected).  Most agreements involving IP exchanges serve a dual function: they serve as an instrument 
conveying the interest or right of use in IP and delineate the parties’ obligations in connection with the 
transaction. 
160 See Torremans, supra note 159. 
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choice of law rule adopted by the adjudicating forum or fora to resolve IP-
specific disputes.  Notwithstanding the parties’ contractual selection of 
New York law, a Japanese court could apply Japanese law because the 
programmer is a Japanese national who lives in Japan and first created the 
software in Japan, thus causing the IP rights in the software to vest in the 
Japanese plaintiff.  The court could instead perhaps enforce the governing 
state law clause of the contract adversely to the Japanese litigant as well as 
the venue clause calling for all disputes to be adjudicated in a New York 
court—but the U.S. firm must keep in mind that the IP rights might have 
initially vested in the plaintiff pursuant to Japanese IP law, and the New 
York law question might simply be whether or not a transfer of the IP 
exists under the operative contract.  The court might even consider German 
law along with U.S. and Japanese law since the software is being exploited 
and/or patented in all three jurisdictions.  This hypothetical demonstrates 
the potential for different legal outcomes depending on the disputed legal 
issues at hand and the choice of law rules adopted by the adjudicating 
forum.161 
In an international IP exchange, the implicated jurisdictions’ IP laws 
may establish and govern the underlying property rights in intangible assets 
that are the subject of the transaction.  The choice of law rules provide the 
means to allocate such property rights through private ordering.162  A 
jurisdiction’s adopted choice of law rule can vary among different choice 
of law principles, such as lex fori,163 lex contractus,164 lex delicti,165 lex 
 
161 See generally EUGEN ULMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
(1978). 
162 See Nimmer, supra note 121, at 849; Maureen A. O’Rourke, Rethinking Remedies at the 
Intersection of Intellectual Property and Contract: Toward a Unified Body of Law, 82 IOWA L. REV. 
1137 (1997). 
163 The lex fori rule postulates the application of the law of the country where the court deciding the 
IP dispute is situated (law of the forum).  This rule often results in the court applying its own law. 
164 See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
165 The lex delicti rule provides for the application of the law of the country where the infringing 
conduct has occurred (the place of the harmful act such as where IP right is exploited or the place where 
the harmful act had its effect).  This rule may require a court to apply foreign law in cases where courts 
assume international jurisdiction with regard to infringements of foreign rights.  See Frohlich, supra 
note 104, at 854; Subafilms Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Curb v. MCA Records, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 586 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd., v. 
Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding 
that, with respect to the plaintiff’s photographic reproductions first produced and published in the U.K., 
U.S. law applies to the infringing acts allegedly committed in the United States not only to determine 
whether the acts were in fact infringing but also to determine whether the work is protectable as an 
original work of authorship under U.S. copyright law); see also Hasbro Bradley v. Sparkle Toys, Inc., 
780 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying U.S. law to determine the copyrightability of work first 
published in Japan but allegedly infringed in the United States). 
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originis,166 and lex protectionis.167  In adopting a rule, most jurisdictions 
typically attempt to strike a balance between public policy interests and the 
expectation and fairness interests of the private parties.  Whether and to 
what extent the parties’ chosen state law will be recognized and applied 
uniformly in a given dispute by the adjudicating forum(s),168 therefore, is 
an open question for the parties, which they may or may not even be aware 
of at the time of contract depending on their relative levels of relevant IP 
legal rules awareness and due diligence. 
Again consider the hypothetical above involving the Japanese 
programmer.  Assume that the Japanese programmer created the software 
in Japan with collaborative input from two of the U.S. firm’s employees 
located in the United States and Germany.  Following the software’s 
commercial success, each party claims the ownership of the IP rights in the 
software—the Japanese programmer, the U.S. firm, and the two American 
and German employees of the U.S. firm—having instituted their own 
lawsuits in the United States and Germany respectively claiming joint 
ownership and an accounting of profits, but the U.S. firm counterclaims 
 
166 The lex originis rule applies the law of the country that has the most significant relationship with 
the works’ origin.  A number of countries such as the United States, Portugal, Greece, France, and 
Romania follow this principle in determining initial ownership.  A criticism of this approach is that it 
can lead to inconsistent application of choice of law rules to parallel registered and unregistered IP 
rights.  The Berne Convention, Article 5(4), presents criteria for determining the country of origin of a 
work of authorship—namely, the law of the place of first publication.  See Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27 (1986), 1161 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention].  In the United States, there have been a series of judgments 
in which the law of the state of origin is given priority.  See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian 
Kurier Inc., 153 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1998) (separating the issues of copyright ownership from 
infringement, the court applied U.S. law to determine infringement in the United States under the lex 
delicti but applied Russian law under the lex originis to determine ownership of works created and first 
published in Russia).  See also GRAEME B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 1167 (2d ed. 2001). 
167 The lex protectionis rule applies the law of the country for which protection is sought.  This rule 
may give rise to the application of foreign law.  A criticism of this approach is that it can lead to a 
country-by-country approach where the protection is sought that may impair the exploitation of IP 
rights at the international level except when a supranational unitary IP right is involved such as a patent 
granted under the European Patent Convention.  See Hitachi Ltd. v. Seiji Yonezawa, Case No. Heisei 
14(ne) 6451 (Tokyo High Court, Jan. 29, 2004), translated in 14 SELECTED ARTICLES FROM YUASA & 
HARA 1, 5–9 (2004), available at http://www.yuasa-hara.co.jp/english/news/pdf/ipnews014.pdf (In a 
case involving litigation over a Japanese employee invention, where the governing law for 
compensation for succession to patent rights in the invention were in dispute, the court held that in 
determining an employer vis-à-vis employee’s ownership of foreign patent applications, the law of each 
country where patent application is made should apply.  However, the court extended the application of 
Article 35 of the Japanese Patent Act to foreign patent rights by holding that the Japanese employee’s 
right to compensation extended to the foreign patents on the same invention as well). 
168 It is quite usual for transnational parties in an IP infringement dispute to be locked in parallel 
proceedings in more than one jurisdiction. 
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ownership based on the “work for hire” doctrine.  In a case like this, one 
could only speculate as to the legal outcome. 
In adjudicating the IP ownership issues, a court in Japan might adopt a 
different choice of law rule than a court in the United States or Germany, 
which will likely lead to the application of different substantive IP laws,169 
potentially resulting in significantly varying outcomes in each implicated 
jurisdiction with respect to the same invention or object of IP perhaps with 
different owners or co-existing fragmented ownership.  For instance, a 
Japanese court might apply Japanese law in holding the Japanese 
programmer as the owner under lex originis, a U.S. court might apply New 
York law in holding the U.S. firm as the owner under lex contractus, and a 
German court might apply German law in finding joint ownership of the 
German employee under lex protectionis.  This example underscores the 
transactional inefficiencies and high transaction costs incurred by parties in 
international IP exchange. 
Given that there is no uniformity in substantive IP law worldwide, one 
can safely assume a meaningful risk that the outcome under each of the 
foregoing approaches can significantly and substantively vary.  
Accordingly, legal unpredictability presents a significant threat to 
international IP exchanges and the viability of the corresponding IP 
markets.  The urgent need for international convergence on choice of law 
rules in IP-related cross-border disputes has precipitated several national 
and regional initiatives in recent years, but no global consensus has 
emerged to date.170 
 
169 For example, employee-made inventions are treated very differently in many jurisdictions.  
Some jurisdictions define the employer as the initial owner of an invention made by an employee 
during the course of employment, while others define the employee as the initial owner of such 
inventions or works.  See, e.g., Baldia, supra note 99.  While many jurisdictions give effect to 
contractual agreements between the employer and employee allocating ownership rights in the 
employee-made inventions or works, additional protections afforded to employees under local laws and 
the lex laboris rule may nonetheless apply in disputes as to ownership of such inventions or works.  For 
example, Germany has special labor laws (Arbeitnehmererfindungsgesetz v. 18.1.2002 (BGB1.I S.414) 
(F.R.G.)) with mandatory rules to protect employees’ interests in such inventions while the United 
States and the U.K. predominantly regard employee-made inventions as a matter of contract law.  
Japanese law provides for reasonable remuneration to employees when they pass to their employers the 
right to obtain patents for their inventions or they give the employers exclusive rights to such 
inventions.  See Tokkyohō [Patent Act] art. 35(3) (Japan); Jean E. Healy, Application of Japanese 
Article 35 Regarding Reasonable Compensation for Patents by Employed Inventors in Syuji Nakamura 
v. Nichia Corporation, 17 PACE INT’L L. REV. 387 (2005). 
170 For examples of national and regional initiatives with diverging approaches to establish 
harmonized legal rules, see Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, 117 OFFICIAL J. EUR. UNION 6 (2008); ALI PRINCIPLES §§ 301, 302 (proposing a 
comprehensive set of conflict of law principles specifically focused on international jurisdiction, 
applicable law, and the recognition of judgments in intellectual property disputes).  For a discussion of 
various approaches to determine initial ownership issues, see ALI PRINCIPLES § 313 cmt.  The ALI 
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As innovation becomes increasingly collaborative and globally 
dispersed, conflicts over IP ownership, commercial use, and infringement 
routinely arise in the context of employment, contractor, or collaborative 
agreements.  Accordingly, internationally un-harmonized choice-of-law 
rules, combined with minimally harmonized substantive IP laws, can create 
substantial inefficiencies for transaction parties and impair the productivity 
gains to be expected from cross-border IP exchange and collaborative 
innovation.171 
 
C.  Forum Contingencies and Ex Post Transaction Costs 
 
The ultimate decision of whether to apply the parties’ chosen law rests 
with the adjudicating forum.172  As observed infra,173 public policies, 
mandatory rules, and other interests of implicated jurisdictions may conflict 
with each other, which might cause an implicated national court to override 
the parties’ chosen law and apply its own or another jurisdiction’s 
substantive law to the dispute.174  Similarly, an arbitral tribunal may choose 
to apply mandatory rules of implicated jurisdictions notwithstanding the 
parties’ chosen law for varying reasons such as to limit the award’s 
enforceability challenges in the implicated jurisdictions.175 
In international IP exchanges, transactional parties contractually 
designate adjudicating fora for dispute resolution which may be a national 
 
Principles favor party autonomy and propose applying parties’ choice of law to determine initial 
ownership issues for greater uniformity of outcome worldwide, which it believes facilitates 
marketability and enhances value of IPRs.  In the absence of parties’ choice of law, the ALI Principles 
propose that the law of the state with the closest connection to the parties and the subject matter should 
apply.  For similar initiatives in Europe, Japan, and Korea, see THE EUROPEAN MAX PLANCK GROUP 
ON CONFLICT OF LAW & INTELLECTUAL PROP., PRINCIPLES FOR CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (Third Preliminary Draft, Sep. 1, 2010) [hereinafter CLIP PRINCIPLES], available at 
http://www.ip.mpg.de/shared/data/pdf/draft-clip-principles-01-09-2010.pdf; TRANSPARENCY OF JAPANESE 
LAW PROJECT, TRANSPARENCY PROPOSAL ON JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2009) [hereinafter JAPAN 
PROPOSAL], available at http://www.tomeika.jur.kyushu-u.ac.jp/ip/pdf/Transparency%20RULES%20% 
202009%20Nov1.pdf; KOREAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASS’N, PRINCIPLE ON INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LITIGATION (2010).  For a comparative study of the ALI, CLIP, and JAPAN 
PROPOSAL, see Paulius Jurcys, International Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Disputes: CLIP, ALI 
Principles and Other Legislative Proposals in a Comparative Perspective, 3 JIPITEC 174 (2012); 
HAGUE PREPARATORY WORK, supra note 137. 
171 See Guido Westkamp, Research Agreements and Joint Ownership of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Private International Law, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 637, 637–61 
(2006). 
172 See Katz, supra note 130, at 179–81; Meyer, supra note 91, at 135. 
173 See infra notes 179–181 and accompanying text. 
174 See Patchel, supra note 136, at 124–27; Werra, supra note 117, at 42–43. 
175 HAGUE PREPARATORY WORK, supra note 137. 
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court, an arbitral tribunal, or a combination of both depending on a number 
of factors such as the nature and scope of the contractual relationship and 
the transacted IP, the type of remedy sought, neutrality, expertise, and 
parties’ other preferences.176  In forum selection, parties seek to expressly 
implicate fora that they believe offer relative predictability and greater 
probability of enforcing the parties’ choices.177  But such forum selection 
clauses can indeed meet a fate similar to the choice of law clauses because 
of un-harmonized private international IP law rules. 
In some cases a court may refuse to assert jurisdiction or otherwise 
adjudicate a dispute on different grounds.  A court may simply recognize 
party autonomy and enforce the parties’ forum selection provision.  A court 
might instead conclude that it has an insufficient connection to the parties 
or the dispute, or it might apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens.178  A 
court might only partially recognize forum selection by separating non-
contractual IP-related claims from contractual claims and limiting the 
parties’ choice to claims of the latter type only. 
Conversely, an implicated court may exercise jurisdiction over a case 
notwithstanding a choice of forum clause if it determines that the selected 
foreign court lacks sufficient connection to the dispute or the parties.179  
Even if the parties’ chosen law is given effect, it does not guarantee 
uniformity of application; different courts might interpret and apply the 
same statutory or decisional sources in different ways.180  In the event of a 
dispute, national courts determine the ultimate construction of law and 
contracts that may have diverging interpretations of identical legal 
provisions.181  As many modern conflicts of law regimes were designed in 
the domestic context without any international dimension in mind, chosen 
state law will likely not anticipate and address cross-border multinational 
issues. 
Potential diversity of possible fora and outcomes notwithstanding, 
both a choice of state law and choice of forum clause can result in 
inconsistent decisions with issues that overlap in different fora.  
 
176 See AVRIL D. HAINES, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, CHOICE OF COURT 
AGREEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: THEIR USE AND LEGAL PROBLEMS TO WHICH THEY 
GIVE RISE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERIM TEXT (2002), available at http://www.hcch.net/ 
upload/wop/gen_pd18e.pdf.  
177 Id. at 8. 
178 Id. at 7.  
179 Id. at 6. 
180 See Katz, supra note 130, at 179 (“[L]ocal legal culture, procedural and evidentiary rules or 
other resource constraints may make one tribunal considerably less inclined to take an open-ended 
approach to gap filling than another.”). 
181 See Michael Sturley, International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic 
Law in Conflicts of Interpretation, 27 VA. J. INT’L L. 729, 729 (1987). 
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Furthermore, the enforcement of any successful judgments in any forum 
against a transaction party’s foreign-based assets weaves an additional 
layer of complexity into the transaction cost problem because a judgment 
rendered in one jurisdiction may not be recognized and enforced by another 
jurisdiction.182  While international efforts to converge legal rules relative 
to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards across 
multiple jurisdictions have been very successful, culminating in the New 
York Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards,183 similar efforts to converge international legal rules relative to 
foreign judgments have not garnered much international support.184 
Such adjudicative forum contingencies create the risk of parties 
having to pursue parallel litigation in multiple fora in order to enforce their 
rights.  This risk is further exacerbated by the lack of international 
convergence on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.185  
Accordingly, forum contingencies can create high ex post transaction costs 
for transactional parties because of the unpredictable and potentially high 
litigation costs and significant uncertainty as to legal outcomes.  This 
undermines the value proposition of the underlying cross-border IP 
exchange transaction.186 
 
V.  A PRIVATE RULEMAKING SOLUTION TO THE 
TRANSACTION COST PROBLEM 
 
As observed supra,187 cross-border IP exchange transactions suffer 
from inefficiently high ex ante transaction costs resulting in incomplete 
contracts and deferred ex post transaction risk.  Ex ante transaction costs 
are high because of the diverse and territorial nature of IP law in individual 
states.  Incomplete contracts occur because transaction parties forego 
 
182 See generally HAGUE ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 148. 
183 See infra note 202.  As of December 2013, 149 countries have adopted the New York 
Convention.  The Convention requires courts of contracting states to give effect to private agreements 
to arbitrate and to recognize and enforce arbitration awards made in other contracting states.  See NEW 
YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2014). 
184 In contrast to the New York Convention, the Hague Convention on Foreign Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters has only a handful of signatories (Cyprus, Kuwait, the Netherlands, and 
Portugal).  See Status Table, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index_ 
en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=78 (last visited Jan. 17, 2014). 
185 See generally HAGUE ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 148. 
186 See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1206, 1208 (1998) 
(“[I]n modern times a transaction can legitimately be regulated by the jurisdiction where the transaction 
occurs, the jurisdictions where significant effects of the transaction are felt, and the jurisdictions where 
the parties burdened by the regulation are from.”).  
187 See supra Part III. 
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expensive ex ante searches and instead rely on traditional choice of state 
law and choice of forum provisions as a substitute for diligence.  As a 
result, the parties reduce the ex ante costs by sheer avoidance, but defer risk 
to ex post realization. 
Parties ostensibly avoid perceived high ex ante transaction costs of 
search and bargain through reliance on these provisions, but the benefit of 
doing so, other than cost avoidance, is speculative and illusory; it injects 
unknown and potentially unbounded risk into the transaction value 
proposition.  In so doing, parties (i) take on unknown transaction risk 
because of lack of visibility and predictability into the numerous possible 
IP-related contingencies in a particular transaction, (ii) forego discovery 
and understanding of the various mandatory rules of potentially implicated 
regimes that can subvert their selected state law, (iii) forego the leverage of 
the doctrine of party autonomy by failing to enter more complete contracts 
that identify and address a more expanded menu of IP-related 
contingencies and avoid conflict with mandatory rules,188 (iv) defer 
quantifiable ex ante transaction costs to unquantifiable ex post enforcement 
costs, which are potentially much higher than the foregone ex ante costs 
due to the risk and high costs of litigation and enforcement proceedings in 
multiple fora, and (v) fail to sufficiently predict or expect the recognition 
and enforcement among all implicated jurisdictions of these choice of state 
law and forum clauses due to the territorial nature of IP law and the lack of 
harmonized private international IP law rules. 
Accordingly, the current legal framework for private international IP 
exchange places the parties in a highly inefficient Hobson’s choice.  The 
parties must either (a) absorb high ex ante transaction costs via search and 
bargain activity related to the IP laws and rules of potentially implicated 
jurisdictions in an effort to achieve a more complete contract, without 
proportional increased transparency into the value of doing so, or (b) 
forego some financially meaningful portion of those ex ante costs without 
sufficient transparency into the potentially more costly and consequential 
unknown ex post risk of doing so.  In either case, parties are essentially 
reduced to the unsophisticated proposition of “flying blind” in some 
meaningful degree relative to the transaction.  The transaction therefore 
suffers from inherent inefficiency that ultimately undermines the 
international IP exchange market.  As such, a solution is needed to lower 
transaction costs and enhance transactional efficiency in cross-border IP 
 
188 Most states recognize the doctrine of party autonomy so long as the parties’ chosen law does not 
run afoul of the implicated state’s mandatory laws, which opens the door for parties to include 
supranational or non-binding rules as governing law into their contract terms.  See Meyer, supra note 
91, at 135. 
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exchange.  This should aim to reduce legal risk through transparency and 
predictability of legal outcomes. 
 
A.  The Need for Legal Reform: Normative Private International 
Transactional IP Rules To Reduce Transaction Costs 
 
This author posits that private rulemaking is the most viable approach 
to lower transaction costs and increase transaction efficiencies in cross-
border IP exchange transactions.189  The author envisions the development 
of normative, nonbinding private international transactional IP rules in the 
form of nonbinding guiding principles, a model code, or a restatement.  
These INT-IP Rules would be best developed by an international, non-
governmental organization that could also administer the INT-IP Rules.  
The INT-IP Rules would comprehensively address substantive and 
procedural legal contingencies of cross-border IP exchanges through the 
active participation and debate of private, non-state actors from the 
international IP legal and business community.190  The development and 
use of these INT-IP Rules would provide, within the realm of cross-border 
IP exchange transactions, reduced access costs to the necessary 
transparency, autonomy, uniformity, flexibility, and predictability—and 
hence efficiency—that private transactional parties need.191  Moreover, the 
development and leverage of global INT-IP Rules would not only yield far 
more efficient cross-border IP transactions, but also increase market 
participation, which itself fosters greater overall market efficiency, higher 




189 See supra Part IV.B. 
190 Although a thorough and detailed analysis of the proposed private rulemaking approach and 
development of INT-IP Rules exceed the scope of this article, the following are supporting observations 
to advance the discussion forward. 
191 See Goldsmith, supra note 186, at 1296; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to 
Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2277 (2000); John Honnold, A Uniform Law for 
International Sales, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 299 (1959); Hassel E. Yntema, Unification of the Laws 
Respecting Negotiable Instruments, 4 INT’L L.Q. 178 (1951). 
192 See Meyer, supra note 91, at 122–23.  There is ample economic literature that supports the 
hypothesis that lowering transaction costs can lead to increased trading or market efficiencies.  See, e.g., 
Bin Gu & Lorin Hitt, Transaction Cost and Market Efficiency (2001) (Twenty-Second Int’l Conference 
on Info. Sys.) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/ ~lhitt/tcme.pdf; 
Hugh McDonald et. al., Trading Efficiency in Water Quality Markets, The NZARES Conference 
Tahuna Conference Proceedings (Aug. 26–27, 2010) (The NZARES Conference Tahuna Conference 
Proceedings) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/96949/ 
2/2010_22_Trading%20efficiency%20in%20water%20quality%20markets.pdf. 
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B.  Private Rulemaking Should Be Preferred over Public “Top-
Down” Structuring Among States 
 
The success and efficiency of private rulemaking through the 
development of nonbinding norms or principles (also referred to as soft 
law) to facilitate other categories of international commercial activity are 
well documented.193  Among the most notable successes of soft law include 
(i) UNCITRAL’s Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,194 
which assists member states in reforming and modernizing their laws on 
arbitral procedure so as to take into account the particular features and 
needs of international commercial arbitration, (ii) the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts,195 which set forth 
generally accepted aspects of international commercial contract law that 
serve as a guide to contract interpretation, (iii) the ICC’s Uniform Customs 
and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP 500),196 which established 
modern banking practices now implicitly incorporated into the various 
documentary credit contracts, (iv) the ICC’s International Rules for the 
Interpretation of Trade Terms (2000 INCOTERMS), which is a 
transnational set of conditions on price and delivery applied uniformly in 
international sale of goods contracts, and (v) ICANN’s Uniform Domain 
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), which provides a set of legal 
rules to resolve domain name disputes and a system of best practices for 
domain name registration authorities.  Although soft law principles do not 
begin as positive law, they can (and many do) become positive law or de 
facto legal standards over time as they are adopted by adjudicating fora, 
legislatures, or transactional parties.197  The authority of soft law or 
 
193 Soft law refers to instruments of normative nature with no legally binding force and is applied 
only through voluntary acceptance.  See generally Henry Deeb Gabriel, The Advantages of Soft Law in 
International Commercial Law: The Role of UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL, and The Hague Conference, 34 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 65 (2009); Graeme Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property System: 
Treaties, Norms, National Courts and Private Ordering, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 60, 61–
114 (Daniel Gervais ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2007). 
194 UNCITRAL, MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 40 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985).  See also Wagner, supra note 83, at 2 (noting that a state’s 
“adoption of UNCITRAL texts makes it easier for foreign practitioners to find their way into a foreign 
legal system that otherwise would be very difficult to access”). 
195 See Michael Joachim Bonell, The CISG, European Contract Law and the Development of a 
World Contract Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 16–26 (2008). 
196 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. NO. 500, ICC UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR 
DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1993). 
197 Id.  See also Dinwoodie, supra note 193, at 83 (citing a U.S. requirement that many of its 
bilateral treaty trade partners comply with the non-binding WIPO Joint Recommendation on Protection 
of Well-Known Marks); Laurence Helfer & Graeme Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The 
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international norms in specialized fields of law gets more widely 
acknowledged as parties accept it or participate in an activity governed by 
it.198 
This author submits that soft law in the form of a model law, code of 
conduct, customs and usage, model forms, standards, restatements, and 
guiding principles presents an efficient mechanism to create more 
transparent, rationalized, neutral, flexible, and efficient norms to govern 
cross-border transnational conduct involving IP, as well as more flexibility 
in accommodating various legal traditions and local laws implicating IP.199  
Indeed, soft laws can be more effectively and efficiently developed in 
contrast to the formal rigidities and problems associated with the “top-
down” approach to harmonize positive law as exemplified by a number of 
binding supranational instruments or international conventions and 
treaties.200  A few examples of the top-down approach are the United 
Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG),201 a 
supranational instrument which brought a certain level of uniformity in 
substantive law relating to the international sale of goods; the Convention 
for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,202 an 
international treaty which supplies a uniform set of rules applicable to 
international commercial arbitration in member states; and the WTO-
TRIPS Agreement,203 another international treaty which provides minimum 
standards for obtaining and protecting IP rights in member states.  
Despite these examples, the success of this public structuring 
approach to harmonize positive law across multiple jurisdictions is limited 
and is confronted with major challenges due to participating states’ 
divergent and incompatible legal rules, traditions, business and social 
goals, as well as conflicting political, economic, and development 
agendas.204  Thus, resulting IP law treaties and conventions not only tend to 
 
Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141, 245–48 
(2001) (discussing the pace of lawmaking with regard to the practice of cybersquatting through the 
interpretation of UDRP).  Other examples include the influence of the UCC and the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts on the drafting of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts.  See 
Gabriel, supra note 193, at 659. 
198 See e.g., Bonell, supra note 195, at 18–19. 
199 See generally Dinwoodie, supra note 193, at 61–114. 
200 See, e.g., Gabriel, supra note 193. 
201 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 
1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. 
202 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
203 See WTO-TRIPS Agreement, supra note 109. 
204 See generally Christopher Sheaffer, The Failure of the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods and a Proposal for a New Uniform Global Code in International 
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produce rigid instruments with low denominator substantive rules and 
vague standards born from excessively dilutive compromise between 
participating states, but their drafting, negotiation, implementation, 
adoption, and enforcement by member states can also be very lengthy and 
fraught with political maneuvering and stalemate.205  In traditional treaty 
rulemaking, therefore, legal certainty and foreseeability of outcomes is 
often sacrificed to achieve the harmonization goal potentially leading to 
forum shifting, ambiguous minimum standards, misinterpretation by 
adjudicating tribunals, and inflexible binding principles that are incapable 
of readily adapting to the changing IP market realities, which ultimately 
undermines legal certainty for cross-border transaction parties.206  Private 
rulemaking, on the other hand, is a far more expedient and efficient way to 
provide ex ante visibility, transparency, and predictability to private parties 
in international IP exchange. 
 
C.  The Functionality and Benefit of Private INT-IP Rules in 
International IP Exchange 
 
The objective of the proposed INT-IP Rules is to provide clearly 
articulated and comprehensive guidance to international transaction parties 
on transaction design and IP-related legal rules, as well as considerations 
and contingencies inherent in cross-border IP exchanges.  The envisioned 
INT-IP Rules would include collected respective mandatory rules of states, 
thus making transaction parties aware at low to no ex ante cost of the 
limitations of their bargaining and contracting authority vis-a-vis transacted 
IP in jurisdictions potentially implicated by a particular transaction. 
Such a privately developed body of INT-IP Rules could expressly 
identify and address contingencies (such as ownership scope, IP rights 
transferability, and exploitation of IP rights, to name several large core 
contingency categories that routinely arise in cross-border IP exchange) 
 
Sales Law, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 461 (2007) (discussing shortcomings of the CISG 
Convention); Bonell, supra note 195, at 1–4; Dreyfuss, supra note 111, at 1–10 (discussing conflicts 
between developed and developing countries and the futility of the WTO-TRIPS framework to facilitate 
international IP law harmonization). 
205 For example, the New York Convention on arbitral awards, one of the most successful 
international conventions to date, was completed in 1958 but not ratified by the United States until 
1970.  The WIPO Treaty on the Protection of Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits 
took 5 years to conclude in 1989, and it has only been ratified by Egypt and acceded to by Saint Lucia.  
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1477.  The 
CISG took 13 years of diplomatic negotiations to conclude.  See Sheaffer, supra note 204 (discussing 
shortcomings of the CISG Convention); Edward Kwakwa, Some Comments on Rulemaking at the 
World Intellectual Property Organization, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 179, 181–82 (2002). 
206 See, e.g., Kwakwa, supra note 205; Wagner, supra note 83, at 4; Meyer, supra note 91, at 123. 
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and at a level of granularity not otherwise attainable either by parties 
themselves relative to a particular transaction or public bargaining entities.  
The INT-IP Rules would facilitate well-informed ex ante decisions and 
efficient bargaining between parties, as well as ex post risk and reward 
allocation.  Effectively, INT-IP Rules would be a comprehensive and 
transparent source of legal rules relating to the transactional aspects of IP 
rights and related contingencies.  Private transaction parties would use the 
INT-IP Rules to identify and understand relevant contingencies and to 
bargain toward and enter into more complete mutually acceptable contract-
based resolutions of those contingencies via the express terms in contracts 
for specific transactions.  In so doing, private parties could select the INT-
IP Rules as a stand-alone source of “law” applicable to their IP exchange, 
or the parties could readily tailor individual rules to their specific 
transaction.207 
The potential benefit of INT-IP Rules can be illustrated by returning 
to the hypothetical in Part IV.B involving the U.S. firm and Japanese 
programmer.  Unlike in the prior hypothetical construct, here the parties 
mutually stipulate that all or some material subset of this author’s 
envisioned INT-IP Rules shall be included in and govern their express 
contract.  In this construct, both parties will have indistinguishable 
knowledge of the governing IP rules and such rules, being fully accessible, 
provide a high level of transparency at relatively low, and likely 
indistinguishable, transaction costs.  Accordingly, the parties are able to 
more efficiently bargain prior to transaction entry and after entry to resolve 
disputes because neither party should occupy any substantive or procedural 
information advantages over the other party.  With respect to ex post risk, 
legal outcomes for both parties are correspondingly more predictable since 
a more complete contract that expressly spells out the provisions 
addressing the specific IP-related contingencies treated in INT-IP Rules 
helps leverage party autonomy, foster greater probability of court 
enforcement of the parties’ explicitly bargained-for terms, and avoid court 
reference to general governing state law sources.208 
Of course, INT-IP Rules cannot wholly avoid the risk of enforcement 
scrutiny in adjudicating fora because soft law rules indeed are not self-
enforcing, unlike positive law. National courts of course do not always 
recognize private contract terms, such as when they conflict with 
 
207 See Wagner, supra note 83, at 4 (noting the important advantage of foreseeability that comes 
with clear cut rules that parties may adopt or contract around). 
208 Moreover, the hypothetical parties can achieve further predictability by including a provision 
that requires binding arbitration to adjudicate any disputes between them, a result that leverages both 
party autonomy and the greater tendency of courts to recognize arbitral awards.  See Meyer, supra note 
91, at 135. 
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mandatory rules.209  Accordingly, wholly-adopted or incorporated private 
legal rules in the form of INT-IP Rules cannot always completely avoid the 
specter of adjudicating fora ignoring the express principles set forth in the 
parties’ contract and peering more generally into the expressly designated 
governing state law of the contract or the laws of the state in which the 
adjudicating body is located, resulting in the application of legal rules or 
principles in conflict with particular individual INT-IP Rules.210  But 
numerous, if not most, sovereign states’ laws recognize and adhere to the 
doctrine of party autonomy so long as such rules do not directly conflict 
with mandatory rules.211  And in all events, however, INT-IP Rules by 
definition would create a far more reliable, transparent, and useful legal 
topography for parties to leverage in an effort to minimize such 
enforcement risk by entering more complete contracts based on 
symmetrical information.  Parties could leverage their autonomy to a much 
fuller extent than under the current, inefficient fragmented legal framework 
of national laws. 
Thus, the envisioned INT-IP Rules would not only reduce the 
transaction parties’ ex ante search and bargaining costs by enabling them to 
allocate and manage risk and enter more complete contracts with reduced 
asymmetrical information and opportunism, but also to meaningfully 
reduce potential ex post enforcement costs.  This allows parties to benefit 
from party autonomy, have greater visibility into recognition and 
enforcement, and avoid conflicts with mandatory rules, thus substantially 
reducing unpredictability of legal outcomes.  INT-IP Rules would permit 
private parties to contract away from, and reduce uninformed or undesired 
dependence on, “gap filling” legal rules of implicated jurisdictions by 
expressly choosing to apply INT-IP Rules as binding and controlling 
authority in connection with IP rights allocation, management, exploitation, 
and dispute resolution in international IP exchange transactions. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
International IP transfer markets play a critical role in firms’ 
leveraging of their IP and participation in globalization and innovation.  
Indeed, empirical data overwhelmingly demonstrate that firms recognize 
this through the remarkable growth of IP filings, licensing and other 
exchange transactions, and IP enforcement activities. The efficient 
exchange of IP among transaction parties is fundamental to the continued 
 
209 See Bonell, supra note 195, at 22. 
210 Id. 
211 See supra notes 140–147 and accompanying text. 
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development of these IP markets.  Excessive transaction costs, however, 
impose needless inefficiencies on cross-border IP exchange transactions.  
As a result of the territoriality of IP laws, parties lack visibility into the 
potential multiple state IP law regimes that could be implicated in any 
particular IP exchange transaction and that could undermine deal value 
expectations. 
Parties face the ex ante Hobson’s choice to incur potentially 
disproportionate diligence and bargaining costs relative to the transaction 
value or forego such costs and take on unknown ex post enforcement risk.  
More particularly, in cross-border IP exchanges it is routinely impractical 
and costly for parties to always anticipate and determine the multiple legal 
contingencies that might arise through the application of the IP laws of 
jurisdictions that a transaction might implicate.  Legal theory indeed 
accepts the premise that parties do forego this diligence, resulting in 
incomplete contracts and higher enforcement risk.  Parties rely on the blunt 
instruments of choice of law and choice of venue contract provisions that 
fail to meaningfully address the very particular IP law contingencies 
inherent in complex cross-border IP exchange, and accordingly fail to 
mitigate IP-related transaction risk and provide necessary predictability.  
The failure of this primitive existing framework to protect parties’ value 
expectations in IP exchange in the 21st century calls for an urgent 
rethinking of the impact and nature of transaction costs and how best to 
mitigate them to assist global IP markets to achieve their full potential. 
This Article submits that the development of private international 
transactional IP rules by a non-governmental organization would provide 
transaction parties with transparent and low cost ex ante access to a body of 
rules to address IP contingencies, particularly transactions, and potentially 
avoid conflict with the unintended default and mandatory IP rules in 
implicated jurisdictions.  The use of such INT-IP Rules would result in far 
more complete contracts with much lower ex ante transaction costs and 
correspondingly lower ex post enforcement risk by leveraging the 
internationally recognized principle of party autonomy.  Accordingly, 
parties would enjoy correspondingly far greater predictability with respect 
to their deal value expectations thus resulting in much needed increase in 
IP exchange transaction efficiencies. 
